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ABSTRACT
Property rights and religious liberty seem to share little in 
common. Yet surprisingly similar claims have long been made on 
their behalf, including bold assertions that each of these two rights 
uniquely limits the power of the state and serves as the foundation 
for other rights. This Article reframes the conception of property 
rights and religious liberty as foundational by foregrounding 
communitarian aspects of each right. Property and religious freedom 
are a foundation for other rights, but in a different manner than 
traditional accounts suggest. It is not the individual exercise of these 
rights that provides a foundation for other rights, but rather the 
complementary roles these rights play in the formation of normative 
communities that, in turn, serve as counterweights to the state. 
This Article makes three distinct contributions to the existing 
legal literature. First, it highlights the significant similarities in 
historical and theoretical conceptions of the foundational status of 
these two rights. Second, it integrates the developing scholarly 
literature on the communal and institutional nature of these two 
rights. Third, it builds upon this literature to contend that the right to 
property and religious freedom can indeed provide important 
foundations for rights more generally, but only if we sufficiently 
protect and nurture, through law, the communities and institutions 
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upon which these rights depend. The Article concludes by suggesting 
new approaches to assessing a diverse set of contemporary legal 
disputes: religious communities seeking to relocate in the face of 
local government opposition, Native American communities 
challenging government actions on sacred lands, and Sanctuary 
churches opposing immigration enforcement by sheltering 
individuals on their property. 
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INTRODUCTION
At first blush, property rights and religious freedom appear to 
share little in common. The former concern the possession, use, and 
disposition of (traditionally) material goods and land.1 The latter 
1. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31-32 (1988) 
(“The concept of property is the concept of a system of rules governing access to 
and control of material resources.”); c.f. J. Peter Byrne, What We Talk About When 
We Talk About Property Rights – A Response to Carol Rose’s Property as the 
Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1996) (“[P]roperty is an 
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deals instead with the intangible realm of belief and the freedom of 
conscience.2 Upon deeper reflection, such simplistic formulations 
break down. Property rights are asserted in intangible creations, and 
the free exercise of religion includes, in part, activities in the 
physical world. But the basic point remains: These are very different 
rights not often discussed together, at least in contemporary 
discourse. Yet these seemingly disparate rights together figured 
prominently in the conception of limited government embraced by 
members of the Founding generation, most notably James Madison.3
The American experiment was grounded in a rejection of twin 
strictures of the past in the form of religious establishments and 
feudal property.4
In addition, intriguingly similar (and frequently grandiose) 
claims have long been made regarding the importance of these two 
rights. These include assertions that each of these rights serves as a 
foundation for the recognition and protection of individual rights 
more generally.5 Along these lines, the right to property has been 
institution designed to mediate claims among competing claimants (usually private) 
for resources; constitutional rights, by contrast, such as the free exercise of religion, 
are intentionally designed to mediate between a private party and the State.”). 
2. See Note, Toward A Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056, 1058 (1978) (“The free exercise clause was at the very least designed to 
guarantee freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters 
of belief.”). 
3. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 210-11 (1990) (arguing that while Madison invoked 
freedom of religion in some of his earliest discussions of limited government, it was 
property that primarily shaped his “conception of constitutional government”).
4. See id. at 210 (“Religious persecution had brought many to the colonies 
in the first place, and conflicts over religious freedom continued to arise in the new 
land.”); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 51 (1997) (arguing that 
for republican lawyers during the Founding period “feudalism and feudal property 
were the dominant symbols for the past that was rejected or, rather, transcended”);
Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary 
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 471-73 (1976) (discussing Jefferson’s efforts to 
abolish primogeniture and entail). 
5. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 
1890-91 (2005) (“The claims often made on behalf of private property are truly 
extraordinary. Theorists do not merely make the familiar utilitarian arguments that 
private ownership is important because it creates incentives for productive activity. 
They frequently make the far more dramatic claim that property rights must be 
protected because they constitute the very foundation for many other liberties 
citizens enjoy.”). Such claims are made by authors at widely different places along 
the ideological spectrum. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY
109 (2010) (“Without enforceable rights in resources, cooperation stalls or breaks 
down, insecurity grows, and freedom shrinks in all its dimensions.”); AYN RAND,
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described as “the guardian of every other right,”6 “a guarantor of 
liberty,”7 “the basis of power” in democracy,8 “the fountainhead of 
personal liberty,”9 “the foundation of civil liberty,”10 “the keystone 
right,”11 and “an essential pre-condition to the realization of other 
basic civil rights and liberties.”12 Classical liberal accounts of 
property rights highlight their role in promoting individual liberty 
and self-determination and insulating property owners from 
intrusions by the state. They suggest that property rights provide a 
bulwark between the individual and the state, enabling an economic 
independence that frees individuals from coercion. Property rights 
thereby serve as a necessary precondition for the exercise of other 
liberties, enhancing individual dignity and fostering a richly 
pluralistic society. 
Similarly bold language is invoked in reference to religious 
freedom, which has been declared “the mother of many other 
THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 110 (1964) (“Without property rights, no other rights 
are possible.”); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 75, 75-76 (2010) (“In the ongoing discussion about private property and 
whether government does or does not respect it adequately, it is widely assumed (i) 
that property is an essential component or protection of individual liberty, and (ii) 
that liberty increases in fullness the more firmly we protect property against 
governmental restrictions or invasions.”). 
6. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (3d ed. 2008). 
7. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 59
(1993).
8. This phrase was invoked in 1787 in a paper supporting adoption of the 
Constitution. See Noah Webster, An Examination of the Leading Principles of the 
Federal Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
59 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) (“Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, 
that property is the basis of power; and this, being established as a cardinal point, 
directs us to the means of preserving our freedom.”).
9. ELY, supra note 6, at 172 (“Drawing on the property-centered 
constitutional philosophy of John Locke, Americans have long seen individual 
property rights as the fountainhead of personal liberty and political democracy.”).
10. Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 355 (1851) (“The right 
of accumulating, holding and transmitting property, lies at the foundation of civil 
liberty. Without it, man no where rises to the dignity of a freeman. It is the incentive 
to industry, and the means of independent action. It is in vain that life and liberty are 
protected—that we are entitled to trial by Jury, and the freedom of the press, and the 
writ of habeas corpus—that we have unfettered entails, and have abolished 
primogeniture—that suffrage is free, and that all men stand equal under the law, if 
property be held at the will of the Legislature.”).
11. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 329, 329 (1996). 
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948). 
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rights,”13 the “source and synthesis of . . . rights,”14 the “[g]reat 
[b]arrier,”15 and the “first freedom.”16 As with property, religious 
liberty is ascribed a distinct role as an important limit on the power 
of government actors that shields other individual rights from the 
reach of the state.17 Both rights are attributed central roles in the 
historical development of the concept of limited government and the 
recognition and evolution of other individual rights.18 These rights 
also represent paradigmatic examples of complementary spatial and 
transcendental dimensions of liberty that the Supreme Court 
distinguished in Lawrence v. Texas.19
Taken on its own terms, the claim that the individual exercise 
of either of these rights provides a practical check on the power of 
the state and, by itself, can protect individual rights more generally 
seems decidedly implausible. For, like all individual rights, the right
to property and religious freedom depend upon the state and its 
institutions for their recognition and their vindication.20 Nonetheless, 
13. John Witte Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 707, 717 
(2001) (quoting GEORG JELLINEK, DIE ERKLÄRUNGDER MENSCHEN-UND 
BÜRGERRECHTE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR MODERNEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 42 (1895)).
14. Letter from John Paul II, Pope, Centesimus Annus, to his Venerable 
Brother Bishops in the Episcopate, et. al. ¶ 47 (1991).
15. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing James Madison’s 
use of phrase). 
16. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First 
Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2000).
17. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 51-55, 93-95 and accompanying text.
19. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from 
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our 
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our 
lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its 
more transcendent dimensions.”).
20. See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. My focus here is on the 
role of the state in enforcing and vindicating rights, rather than on the source of 
rights. As such I put to the side consideration of natural rights theories of religious 
freedom and property rights. My own inclinations in this regard are similar to those 
of Laura Underkuffler, who contends that with regards to freedom of religion (and 
freedom of speech), the state’s role “[i]s at best protecting, and at worst oppressing, 
but whatever its stance, it is—essentially—an external one. The state does not create 
these freedoms, nor allocate them to us. It simply protects—or destroys—what we, 
as human beings, would otherwise freely, naturally, and equally enjoy.” Laura S. 
Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump”? An Examination of Speech and 
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the right to property and religious freedom do make valuable and 
distinct contributions to the recognition and security of individual 
rights more generally. But, I argue, they do so in a very different way 
than traditional accounts suggest. These rights play important and at 
times complementary roles in supporting communities and 
institutions that foster the development of individual identity and 
enable the exercise of other rights. 
In his seminal article Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover 
identified the roles that property law and the Free Exercise Clause 
play in creating boundaries that enable insular communities to 
develop distinct ideologies and to constitute “an integrated world of 
obligation and reality from which the rest of the world is 
perceived.”21 This Article builds on these insights to argue that 
normative communities sustained by the right to property and 
religious liberty also play a crucial and underappreciated role in 
protecting individual rights more generally, both for members of the 
community and for the broader society. They do so in two seemingly 
contradictory ways: by fostering certain democratic virtues, and, at 
times, by consolidating efforts to challenge public norms in the name 
of vindicating individual rights. Consequently, the claim that the 
right to property and religious liberty are uniquely important for the 
recognition of a broader set of individual rights is only convincing in 
Property, 52 ME. L. REV. 311, 321 (2000). In contrast, property rights, as 
Underkuffler writes, “are rarely the simple protection of natural and preexisting 
human freedoms; they are almost always positive rights, allocative rights.” Id. at 
321. There are, of course, defensible philosophical accounts of natural property 
rights. These include, as Jeremy Waldron has framed it, a view of property rights as 
natural rights 
not in the sense that the individuals concerned are born with them (in 
one of the ways that, say, rights to life and liberty are said to be natural), 
but rather in the sense that the force of these rights obtains and can be 
recognized as valid by moral and rational people quite apart from any 
provisions of positive law. 
WALDRON, supra note 1, at 19; see also id. at 138 (discussing Locke’s 
understanding of property rights as natural right). Madison, for his part, 
distinguished between property rights and rights of conscience on this point: 
“Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on 
positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural and inalienable right.” Laura S. 
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 135 (1990) (quoting 
James Madison, Property, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (G. Hunt ed., 
1906)).
21. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 
(1983). 
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a society that provides sufficient protection to the communities and 
institutions through which these rights are exercised.
In recent years scholars of both religious liberty and property 
rights have emphasized communal aspects of each of these rights. In 
the context of religious freedom, a number of scholars have 
developed sophisticated, but controversial, theories of institutional 
free exercise rights.22 The Supreme Court recognized a version of 
such rights in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC.23 In the area of property rights, scholars within the 
“Progressive Property” movement have developed theoretical 
accounts that place renewed emphasis on the communal nature of 
property rights and of property itself. A subset of these scholars, who 
propose a human flourishing account of property, contend that a 
social-obligation norm is intrinsic to the institution of property and 
imposes upon owners certain communal duties.24 This Article seeks 
to place these seemingly quite distinct subjects and sets of literature 
in conversation and in doing so to examine the complementary roles 
that property rights and religious freedom play in the formation of a 
range of normative communities. It is the activities of these
communities, rather than the individual exercise of either right, that 
provide a counterweight to the power of the state and hence serve to 
vindicate a broader set of rights. These communities create the 
22. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 174-75
(2013); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008); sources 
cited infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text. 
23. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 189 (2012). The Court declared that “the text of the First 
Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.” Id. 
at 132. In an earlier Article, I argued that Hosanna-Tabor should be read to reflect 
“[a]n intrinsic theory of institutional free exercise, which would define the scope of 
protections provided to religious institutions based upon the institution’s distinct 
religious exercise and not the interests or religious exercise of individual members.” 
John J. Infranca, Institutional Free Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1693, 1726 (2013). Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman, in an 
important critique of institutional rights, argue that religious institutions should not 
be understood to have rights that are not derivative of their members. Richard 
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L.
REV. 917, 921 (2013). For purposes of my arguments in this Article, it is not 
necessary to distinguish between the potential sources of a religious institution’s 
rights. 
24. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 769 (2009); Gregory S. 
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRES L. 127, 134 (2009); sources cited infra at notes 127-141.
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space—both literally and figuratively—within which social norms 
and virtues are fostered and individual identities are shaped. Such 
communities also better secure the independence necessary to 
challenge the state on the basis of distinct normative commitments. 
A renewed appreciation of the role that property rights and 
religious freedom play in the formation of such communities can 
revive and rehabilitate claims that these rights provide a foundation 
for other rights. It also yields a number of insights for existing legal 
doctrine, particularly in the context of a range of contemporary 
disputes involving both property rights and religious freedom: 
Muslim communities confronting opposition from local governments 
as they seek to locate cemeteries or mosques;25 Native American 
communities challenging government actions on sacred lands;26 and 
religious communities within the New Sanctuary Movement using 
their property to provide shelter to individuals facing deportation, in 
direct violation of federal immigration laws.27 Careful consideration 
of the complex interaction of property rights, religious liberty, and 
communal identity can help shape a more sophisticated theoretical 
account of the value of enhanced legal protections for religious land 
uses, a critique of the inadequate protection of Native American 
sacred sites under current doctrine, and a framework for evaluating 
the communal religious identity and exercise at stake in the 
Sanctuary Church movement. A more communal approach to these 
rights also suggests the need to reassess declarations that the right to 
property and religious liberty are secondary28 or redundant29 rights. 
For such assessments fail to appreciate the role these rights continue 
to play as foundations for rights more generally.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief 
descriptive account of the ways in which these rights have been 
understood as foundational for rights more generally. I first review 
25. See infra Subsection III.A.1.
26. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
27. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
28. See ELY, supra note 6, at 126 (asserting that struggle over legality of 
New Deal programs led to separation of personal liberties from property rights and 
assignment of secondary constitutional status to latter, counter to framers’ beliefs); 
Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom—A Second-Class Right?, 61 EMORY L.J.
971, 971 (2012) (exploring the question of “whether religious freedom is becoming 
. . . a lesser right—one that can be easily overridden by other rights, claims, and 
interests”).
29. See Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 71, 73 (2002) (arguing that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine may 
render the Free Exercise Clause redundant”).
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historical accounts of the relationship between each of these rights 
and other rights and then examine arguments that these rights play 
distinct roles in limiting the power of government actors and 
protecting the exercise of other rights. Part II shifts to a discussion of 
communal conceptions of each of these rights. I argue that while the 
grand claims made on behalf of the right to property and religious 
freedom at times seem to offer little more than rhetorical flourish, 
these rights are foundational for other rights in a less direct, but no 
less important, way than the bold declarations made on their behalf 
might suggest. The right to property and religious freedom provide a 
foundation for other rights by supporting the formation of normative 
communities through which individuals, as bearers of rights, form 
their identity, and that serve, through the individual and communal 
actions of their members, as important counterweights to the power 
of the state. Finally, Part III explores a few implications of the 
account in Part II for specific areas of legal doctrine. The primary 
examples in Part III involve the property rights of religious 
communities, which are often the thickest normative communities 
and which provide an opportunity to examine the synergistic 
relationship between these rights. Finally, I suggest potential 
implications for individual rights claims. 
I. PROPERTY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS FOUNDATIONAL RIGHTS
What does it mean to claim a particular right serves as a 
“foundation” for other rights? There are a few potential 
interpretations relevant to the discussion that follows. First, these two 
rights can be understood as foundational in a historical sense, both 
through their contributions to the concept of limited government 
generally and through more direct relationships with particular 
rights.30 This account suggests that a failure to appreciate and 
adequately protect these particular rights might contribute to, or 
simply reflect, a lack of respect for rights more generally. A second 
and related interpretation frames these rights as foundational to the 
extent they continue to play distinct roles in limiting the scope and
power of the state, enabling the exercise and flourishing of other 
rights. At the risk of mixing metaphors, this is what I term an 
30. C.f. Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, 12-
13 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-73, 
2013) (identifying historical dependence as one among a set of possibilities for how 
one concept might be understood to be the foundation for another).
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“infrastructural” conception of a right as foundational. Part II 
examines this conception more closely in relation to the communal 
exercise of property rights and religious liberty. Third, these two 
rights might be understood as necessary (although not sufficient) 
“pre-condition[s]” for the exercise of other rights.31 Finally, a fourth 
interpretation might frame these rights as foundational in a more 
instrumental fashion, which relates to the third understanding.32 A
state that embraces particular values, such as individual autonomy, 
human dignity, and democratic governance, might deem the 
recognition of particular rights an important or necessary foundation 
for efforts to secure these values. 
In this Part, I survey historical and theoretical claims regarding 
the roles that the right to property and religious freedom each play as 
a foundation for other rights. These claims have typically been 
framed in relation to the individual exercise of these rights.33 Taken 
on their own terms, these claims are implausible, or at the very least 
insufficient, for a series of reasons discussed in Section I.C. 
Nonetheless, they provide important insights into the distinct roles 
these rights play in support of normative communities that serve 
many of the foundational roles ascribed to these two rights.34 These 
communities do so by facilitating a communal and social 
infrastructure that supports the exercise of a broader set of individual 
rights.35 As such they play roles reflective of the second and third 
understandings of a foundation outlined above: as limits on the 
power of the state and pre-conditions for the exercise of other 
individual rights.36
This understanding need not entail the position that the 
foundational right is superior to or should always take precedence 
over other rights.37 Moreover, we might recognize multiple 
31. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948); cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 10 (1962) (“History suggests only that capitalism is a 
necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is not a sufficient condition.”).
32. See infra notes 299-300 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra Section I.A.
34. See Peñalver, supra note 5, at 1917.
35. See id. at 1900.
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
37. Ely himself, while arguing that property rights have inappropriately 
been relegated to a lesser constitutional status than personal rights, concedes that 
“the Constitution seeks to protect several fundamental values, including economic 
interests, but property is not entitled to preferential treatment.” ELY, supra note 6, at 
9. But see Carol M. Rose, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional 
History of Property Rights, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 238, 240 (1993) (book review) 
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foundational rights of equal status. In fact, the right to property and 
religious freedom are not the only rights that have been deemed 
foundational. Others include speech,38 assembly,39 and the right to 
vote.40 Even the phrase the “guardian of every other right,” before 
Arthur Lee used it to refer to property, was invoked in reference to 
freedom of speech in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798.41
Nonetheless, the right to property and religious freedom have 
played particularly significant, recurring, and frequently analogous 
(asserting that the conception of property as “the guardian of every other right” 
implies “that property is not just equal in status with other rights, but takes 
precedence over all others”). 
38. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (“Freedom [of 
thought and speech], one may say [] is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.”); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A 
Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 980, 983-85 (1990) (citing free speech 
as an especially important right because it preserves autonomy, checks 
governmental abuses, advances access to truth, and especially creates an attitude of 
tolerance and self-restraint); cf. Richard Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics 
of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 49-50 (1992) (emphasizing the role of freedom of 
speech in enabling one to challenge government action).
39. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY 56 (2012). Inazu recounts that in the late 1930s Dorothy Thompson, a 
prominent journalist, gave a speech on the freedom of assembly and its relationship 
to freedoms of speech, religion, and the press. She declared: 
The right to meet together for one purpose or another is actually the 
guaranty of the three other rights. Because what good is free speech if it 
impossible to assemble people to listen to it? How are you going to 
have discussion at all unless you can hire a hall? How are you going to 
practice your religion, unless you can meet with a community of people 
who feel the same way? How can you even get out a newspaper, or any 
publication, without assembling some people to do it? 
Id.
40. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[T]he right to 
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[The 
right to vote] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all 
rights.”); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1996) (noting “preeminent importance” 
given to rights to representation and to jury trial during Colonial period, on theory 
that if “left to operate in full force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and 
liberties of the people”).
41. Expressing its objections to the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Virginia 
General Assembly decried an assault against “that right of freely examining public 
characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, 
which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual guardian of every other 
right.” Virginia Resolutions, 21 December 1798, FOUNDERS ONLINE (June 29, 2017), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0128
[https://perma.cc/ZQW4-K4JW] (emphasis added).
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roles in conceptions of limited government.42 The end of feudalism 
and the division of social life into a private economic sphere of 
property and a public political sphere43 mirrors an earlier separation 
of ecclesial and temporal power.44 This Part first examines historical 
and theoretical accounts of how either the right to property or 
religious freedom provides a foundation for the recognition and 
protection of other individual rights. To group them into broad (but 
overlapping) categories, these include claims that: the right to 
property or religious freedom limits the power of the state, enabling 
the exercise and flourishing of other rights; that these rights foster a 
degree of independence and autonomy; and that, historically, the 
recognition of other rights depended in some way upon the right to 
property or religious freedom. Part I concludes by discussing a few 
critiques of claims that the individual exercise of either of these 
rights provides a sturdy foundation for rights more generally. 
A. The Right to Property as a Foundational Right 
In his Second Treatise on Civil Government, John Locke 
asserted that “the preservation of . . . property” is the “great and chief 
end” of government.45 Locke used the term “property” quite broadly 
to include “lives, liberties, and estates.”46 It is to escape the 
inconvenience and uncertainty of the state of nature that individuals 
surrender a certain degree of their liberty so as to better secure this 
property.47 As such, one’s property cannot be taken by the state 
without one’s consent, for allowing such to occur would defeat the 
very end for which one enters into society.48
Influenced by Locke, colonial leaders deemed the protection of 
property “crucial to the preservation of freedom.”49 The Declaration 
42. See NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 210.
43. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM 
AND EQUALITY 294 (1983) (describing how abolition of feudal rights “established 
one of the crucial divisions along which social life is organized today”).
44. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
45. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 124.
46. Id. at §§ 87, 123.
47. Id. at §§ 127, 131.
48. Id. at §§ 138, 222 (asserting that when government arbitrarily takes 
away property it loses its legitimacy and claim to obedience).
49. See ELY, supra note 6, at 28; see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 191-92 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans.,
expanded ed. 2001) (“The first state constitutions . . . clearly emphasized the 
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of Independence reframed Locke’s phrase “life, liberty, and estates” 
as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”; however, this change 
does not signify a rejection of the importance of property rights, as
happiness was “generally equated with economic opportunity” in the 
eighteenth century, and “[t]he right to obtain and possess property 
was at the heart of the pursuit of happiness.”50 Madison, for his part, 
sought to include property in a prefix to the Constitution, which 
would have declared, “government is instituted and ought to be 
exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using 
property and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety.”51 According to Madison, “the rights of persons and the rights 
of property” constituted the “two cardinal objects of government,” 
which were to be balanced by a division of power between the lower 
and upper houses of the legislature.52
Of particular interest for the discussion at hand, while Madison 
and other Federalists invoked property rights as an important limit on 
government action, “some of Madison’s most striking early 
statements about limited government referred not to property, but to 
freedom of religion.”53 Jennifer Nedelsky attributes this in part to the 
greater familiarity early Americans had with government restrictions 
on religious freedom than with threats to property.54 Nonetheless, 
although fear of religious oppression may have provided the initial 
motivation for concerns regarding government intrusion on 
individual rights, it was property that became the focus of this 
concern and of how the Founders crafted the Constitution to address 
it.55 Protections for property, then, served not as, in the words of John 
individual’s claim to legal protection of his property.”); JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF 
RIGHTS 27 (1986) (“In the eighteenth-century pantheon of British liberty there was 
no right more changeless and timeless than the right to property.”). 
50. ELY, supra note 6, at 28-29. 
51. NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting James Madison, Speech in the 
House of Representatives (June 8, 1789)) (emphasis added). 
52. James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for 
Virginia in Works of Madison (Oct. 15, 1788).
53. NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 210 (citing Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance). 
54. Id. (“[T]hreats to freedom of religion, not property, were the form of 
government tyranny originally most familiar to Americans.”).
55. Id. at 211; see also RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 314 (“Although other 
classes of rights still concerned Madison, his analysis of the dangers to property was 
paradigmatic for the program of reform he carried to Philadelphia in May 1787.”). 
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Ely, “the principal function of government” for the Founders, but 
rather as an important means for achieving democratic governance 
and protecting rights more generally.56
In addition to limiting government power, the preservation of 
property rights was understood as ensuring the independence of 
individuals who possessed property.57 As legal historian Hendrik 
Hartog has noted, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
property was seen as “a guarantee of independence,” necessary to 
protect from “the political dependence upon others which constitutes 
corruption.”58 Property did not merely provide an alternative source 
of power that enabled resistance.59 Rather it was believed to enable 
the development of a distinct personality, an autonomous identity 
significantly free from external forces and representative of a 
“classical notion of citizenship.”60 Property guaranteed independence 
56. ELY, supra note 6, at 28. As Stanley Katz remarks: The “American 
revolutionaries,” and Jefferson in particular, “did not defend property as an end in 
itself but rather as one of the bases of republican government.” Katz, supra note 4, at 
470.
57. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 24 
(1983).
58. Id. (quoting J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 92
(1973)). 
59. See id.
60. Id. (“Property made it possible for a person to shape an identity rather 
than to be shaped by external forces.”). The association between property and 
freedom can be traced back further than the seventeenth century. As theologian Jean 
Porter observes, property and personal freedom were increasingly associated during 
the late medieval period. JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW 260 (1999). 
Porter notes that at the same time, as property was linked with the exercise of power 
over others, the lack of property—poverty—was associated with servitude and 
powerlessness. Id. Ben Barros discusses a similar argument, which he frames as the 
claim “that private property is necessary to give people access to resources to be 
free.” D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 51 
(2009). According to Barros, this claim rests on two points: 
First, with the exception of the barest forms of negative freedom, 
freedom is an empty concept if a person does not have the resources to 
act (or refrain from acting) consistent with that freedom. Second, absent 
private property, people will be beholden to others for the resources that 
they need to live their lives, and as a result will be unable to act 
independently and freely. 
Id.; cf. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 300 (“[T]he connection (if one exists) between 
liberty as independence and the idea of private property helps explain the view, 
common until the middle of last century, that the ownership of property was an 
indispensable qualification for ownership and for the franchise.”). 
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(at least for those who possessed it) in part by limiting government 
action.61
The conception of property as a source of independence is 
perhaps most easily grasped in relation to the home and, to an extent,
real property more generally.62 As William Pitt vividly declared: 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through 
it—the storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England 
cannot enter!—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement!63
This vision rests upon a fiction of sorts, for it is only the king’s 
willingness to recognize and respect the individual’s property rights 
(and the rule of law more generally) that keep his forces from 
entering. Yet property’s independence-conferring role need not be 
limited to a shield against coercion. Property as an institution also 
confers important democratic virtues, as a number of the Founders 
emphasized.64
Recognizing the relationship between property, power, and 
autonomy, John Adams argued for the need to ease the acquisition of 
property, reasoning that “[i]f the Multitude is possessed of the 
Ballance of real Estate, the Multitude will have the Ballance of 
Power, and in that Case the Multitude will take Care of the Liberty, 
Virtue, and Interest of the Multitude in all Acts of Government.”65 In 
a similar vein, Jefferson advocated for a wide distribution of property 
in significant part for its political value in relation to republican 
61. See LOCKE, supra note 45, at § 138.
62. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1353 
(1993) (“Compared to other resources, land remains a particularly potent safeguard 
of individual liberty. Like no other resource, land can provide a physical haven to 
which a beleaguered individual can retreat. A land sanctuary directly serves a
variety of so-called ‘negative’ liberties.”); see also HARTOG, supra note 57, at 24 
(“Not all forms of property served equally well to guarantee individual autonomy. 
Real property, by its permanence and its creation of a spatial analogue for personal 
autonomy, had a preferred position.”).
63. Lord Brougham, Lord Chatham, in HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF 
STATESMEN WHO FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF GEORGE III 42 (1855). See Ellickson, 
supra note 62, at 1353 (“Whenever a landowner can credibly threaten to withdraw 
into self-employment on his own land, private property in land helps protect a 
worker from overreaching by employers or state officials.”).
64. See Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0091
[https://perma.cc/THE8-XAH6] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
65. Id.
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government.66 The capacity to tend one’s own soil and supply one’s 
own needs, Jefferson contended, fosters virtue and enables one to 
avoid the dependence that “begets subservience and venality [and] 
suffocates the germ of virtue.”67 These accounts reflect a more 
instrumental understanding of property rights, rather than a 
conception of the protection of property as the chief end of 
government.
The role of property in promoting independence and diffusing 
power is central to contemporary libertarian theories of private 
property, although such theories often downplay the instrumental 
understanding central to earlier accounts.68 The concentration of 
property, it is argued, can create dependence on others, rendering an 
individual subject to coercion.69 In contrast, the diffusion of power 
(and property) fosters independence, including in the political 
realm.70 By providing “an alternative source of power to politics,” 
private property enables an “array of civil and political liberties.”71
It is not only real property that plays this role. As Robert 
Ellickson has asserted, “private ownership of any valuable 
resource—not just land, but also a bank account, a pension, or a 
66. See Katz, supra note 4, at 470-73; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 
27 (distinguishing Jefferson from Lockean tradition on grounds that for Jefferson 
property rights were in significant part social creations).
67. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIX, AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jeffvir.asp [https://perma.cc/
ER8L-T796] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 475 (“It was 
the virtue and judgment produced by . . . independent labor that rendered [small, 
freeholding farmers] capable of becoming republicans, and therefore rendered 
America capable of republican government.”). 
68. Alexander and Peñalver argue that contemporary libertarians invert 
Locke’s understanding of the relationship between property and democratic political 
theory. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO PROPERTY THEORY 36 (2012). They read Locke’s theory of property as 
instrumental and in service to his “defense of democratic self-government against 
pretensions of monarchical absolutism.” Id.
69. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 141 (1960); see also 
BUCHANAN, supra note 7, at 32 (1993) (arguing individuals might exercise power of 
exit to avoid or escape from exploitative economic relationships). 
70. See Rose, supra note 11, at 345 (“The central idea of the Independence 
Argument is that property removes people’s dependence on others, and fundamental 
autonomy makes them capable of exercising unencumbered judgment in the political 
forum. Hence all political powers, and certainly all the other rights, depend on the 
right to property.”).
71. Id. at 340; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 9-10 (arguing that 
private property, even in the context of Tsarist Russia, “provided some check to the 
centralized power of the state”).
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professional license—can confer the economic independence that 
permits genuine political and social choice.”72 In making the case for 
due process protections for government benefits, Charles Reich 
claimed that “property performs the function of maintaining 
independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones 
within which the majority has to yield to the owner. . . . Civil 
liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not 
preserve them.”73 Striking down racially restrictive covenants in 
Shelley v. Kraemer, the mid-twentieth century Supreme Court 
affirmed an important role for property rights in securing liberty 
more generally.74 The Court declared that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment deemed property rights “an essential pre-
condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties 
which the Amendment was intended to guarantee.”75
To summarize, the protection of property was considered a 
principal purpose of government by many of the Founders. Private 
property was understood to play a vital role in ensuring the 
independence of individual citizens and fostering civic virtues, 
thereby contributing to democratic governance more generally. It did 
so by imposing limits on the scope of government action, limits that 
in turn serve to protect a broader set of individual rights. A range of 
contemporary commentators continue to embrace and propound this 
vision of the unique role that individual property rights play in 
fostering independence and providing a foundation for civil rights 
more generally. However, as discussed below, these claims are 
decidedly implausible in the absence of adequate attention to the 
important communal elements of property rights. 
B. Religious Liberty as a Foundational Right
In two separate discussions of religious freedom, Madison 
invoked the image of a “great barrier” that shielded religious liberty 
72. See Ellickson, supra note 62, at 1352 n.178 and accompanying text 
(“Commentators as diverse as Thomas Jefferson, Walter Lippmann, Milton 
Friedman, and Charles Reich have identified private property as a primary, indeed 
often as the primary, foundation for individual freedom.”). 
73. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
Gregory Alexander frames Reich’s argument as a “[v]ariation[] of the republican 
version of the autonomy argument for property.” Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s 
Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1265 (2014).
74. 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948). 
75. Id. at 10. 
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from civil authority.76 This barrier separates “the authority of human 
laws, and the natural rights of Man excepted from the grant on which 
all political authority is founded.”77 For Madison, religious freedom 
was rooted in a pre-political duty of each individual.78 This duty to 
the “Universal Sovereign” takes precedence over any duty to a 
particular Civil Society, and therefore exempts religion from that 
society’s legislative authority, implying a necessary limit on 
government power.79 Madison’s account follows in the tradition of 
Locke’s Letter on Toleration, which emphasized the need “to 
distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of 
religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the 
other.”80 Locke’s formulation suggests that something akin to 
Madison’s “great barrier”81 constricts the scope of civil government 
and that religious freedom is beyond that scope.82
76. JAMES MADISON, DETACHED MEMORANDA (1817) (“This act is a true 
standard of Religious Liberty: its principle the great barrier [against] usurpations on 
the rights of conscience.”). See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE 
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS ¶ 2 (1785) (“The preservation of a free 
Government requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each 
department of power be invariably maintained; but more especially that neither of 
them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the 
people.”).
77. See DETACHED MEMORANDA, supra note 76.
78. See MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
supra note 76, at ¶ 1 (“It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such 
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, 
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. . . . 
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the 
institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its 
cognizance.”).
79. Id. at ¶ 2. John Noonan describes Madison’s “great [b]arrier” as the 
“space where civil society lacks competence.” See John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious 
Liberty at the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459, 461 (1998) (arguing that for Jefferson and 
Madison “[t]he religious right is beyond the power of the state because a human 
being cannot give up his relation and responsibility to God”); see also Vincent 
Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral 
Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 
369 (2016) (discussing how framers derived a natural right to religious liberty from 
duties to God, rather than from commitment to autonomy); cf. Witte, supra note 13,
at 718 (“The classic faiths of the Book adopt and advocate human rights to protect 
religious duties. A religious individual or association has rights to exist and act not 
in the abstract, but in order to discharge discrete religious duties.”).
80. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689). 
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing James Madison’s 
use of phrase). 
82. See LOCKE, supra note 80.
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There is strong evidence suggesting that Madison and other 
Founders had a narrow conception of the religious freedom they 
believed exempt from regulation. Madison emphasized an individual 
duty to render “such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him,” suggesting that freedom of belief and worship, at 
the very least, is included within the scope of this natural religious 
freedom.83 In an essay titled “Property,” he distinguished between 
rights of conscience (which he refers to as a form of property)84 and 
property rights in the more traditional sense: “Conscience is the most 
sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive 
law, the exercise of that, being a natural and inalienable right.”85
According to historian Jack Rakove, Madison (and Jefferson) 
believed “nearly the entire sphere of religious practice could be 
safely deregulated,” a view that led them to “identif[y] the one area 
of governance in which the realm of private rights could be enlarged 
by a flat constitutional denial of legislative jurisdiction.”86 Rakove 
contends that Madison and Jefferson distinguished religious liberty 
from other civil rights in that the state lacked the capacity to act in 
relation to religion, while other civil rights “were essentially 
procedural; they assumed that government had the authority to act, 
but that it had to do so in conformity to the due process of law that 
legislatures and courts both followed.”87 Political scientist Vincent 
Phillip Muñoz echoes this interpretation in a recent article: “The 
framers held that whatever belongs exclusively to [the natural right 
of religious liberty] remains beyond the government’s direct 
prohibition and regulation.”88 Accordingly, while the subject of this 
natural right was deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of the state, 
83. See MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
supra note 76, at ¶ 1; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35
(1977) (“[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual 
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”). 
84. As Hendrik Hartog notes, “[i]n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
property was defined not simply as material possessions but as all the attributes of 
personality that created individuality.” HARTOG, supra note 57, at 23; see also Laura 
S. Underkuffler, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 16 (2003) (citing 
sixteenth and seventeenth century sources that included personal liberties among 
“property”). 
85. Underkuffler, supra note 20, at 135 (quoting James Madison, Property,
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 102 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)).
86. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 312. 
87. Id.
88. Muñoz, supra note 79, at 371.
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the scope of this right appears to have been quite narrow.89 There 
was a consensus that it included belief and acts of worship and did 
not include exemptions from military service on the basis of 
conscience; Muñoz finds disagreement over what other activities 
were also considered beyond the jurisdiction of the state.90
These accounts suggest that, in contrast with the right to 
property, religious freedom’s role in preserving rights more generally 
was understood by prominent framers of the Constitution less in 
terms of diffusing power (and thereby promoting independence) and 
more in terms of limiting the scope of legitimate government 
authority. The recognition of duties to a higher authority implies 
necessary limits on the reach of the state and a rejection of “the 
notion that the political sphere is omnicompetent—that it has rightful 
authority over all of life.”91 For Madison, as Noah Feldman has 
written, “the extension of civil government beyond its proper sphere 
threatened all liberties.”92 This view of religious freedom as a 
primary basis for limited government was widely held at the time of 
the Founding. Historian Richard Hofstadter, in discussing how 
dissenting Protestantism in eighteenth century America contributed 
to political pluralism, notes:
That fear of arbitrary power which is so marked in American political 
expression had been shaped to a large degree by the experience men of 
dissenting sects had had with persecution. Freedom of religion became for 
them a central example of freedoms in general, and it was hardly 
89. See id. at 373 (“[The framers] did not hold that all matters pertaining to 
religion are part of the natural right to religious liberty. [They] distinguished aspects 
of the natural rights of religious liberty from what we might call religious 
‘interests.’”); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)
(discussing views of Madison and Jefferson before declaring that under the Free 
Exercise Clause “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, 
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order”). 
90. Muñoz, supra note 79, at 374. Other claims of religious freedom, which 
were not beyond the jurisdiction of the state, including conscientious objection to 
military service, might receive protection through political institutions. Id.
91. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1247.
92. Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 383 (2002). Justice Black echoed this sentiment when he wrote: 
“[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government 
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its 
respective sphere.” Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 
(1948).
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accidental that the libertarian writers who meant so much to the colonials 
so often stemmed from the tradition of religious dissent.93
By limiting the reach of congressional power specifically and civil 
government generally, religious freedom provides the foundation for 
a civil society independent from the state.94
Along these same lines, contemporary scholars of religious 
liberty who embrace the concept of “the freedom of the church” or 
“church autonomy” emphasize a historical narrative in which the 
very concept of a limited state has its roots in the recognition of a 
separate sphere of authority for religious institutions.95 These 
arguments often run in parallel with the view that the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses are not really about personal religious 
beliefs, but are instead about “the church.”96 For example, Stephen 
Smith traces the commitment to freedom of conscience to what was 
initially “a campaign for freedom of the church—a campaign 
devoted to maintaining the church as a jurisdiction independent of 
the state.”97 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C. invokes this 
93. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF 
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 55 (1969).
94. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998) (ascribing a 
“federalism-based logic” to the First Amendment right of freedom of religion, which 
emphasizes its role in limiting Congressional power). Mary Ann Glendon and Raul 
Yanes, in discussing Amar’s work, assert that “[a] structural reading of the Bill of 
Rights reminds us that the Founders attached particular importance to the kinds of 
rights that help to create conditions for the exercise of other rights.” Mary Ann 
Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 543-
44 (1991).
95. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State 
Separation, & the Ministerial Exception, 106 N.W.U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 180 
(2011) (“By setting the precedent for limited government, institutional religious 
freedom has promoted both political and religious liberty for all, believers and 
nonbelievers alike.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out 
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2000) (“[T]he idea of a jurisdictional 
separation between religious and temporal authority has roots which extend as far 
back as the Fifth Century, long before there was any real conception of individual 
conscience in matters of religion in papal teachings regarding the freedom of the 
church from the control of the Emperor.”). 
96. Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES:
ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 250, 268 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
97. Id. at 250; c.f. Feldman, supra note 92, at 368-69 (discussing how John 
Locke “developed the argument for liberty of conscience by refining the idea of 
separate spheres of authority for religious and worldly affairs” expressed by prior 
thinkers). 
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historic battle, presenting it as the background against which the First 
Amendment was adopted.98
C. Differences and Similarities
The discussion in the prior two Sections suggests an important 
distinction in the nature of claims that either the right to property or 
religious freedom serves to limit government authority and provides 
a foundation for rights more generally. Locke theorized that when 
individuals enter into society they receive, in exchange for their 
natural property rights, “a right to the goods that are theirs 
according to the law of the community.”99 This formulation suggests 
that the regulation of property is, in contrast to religious freedom, 
necessarily within the scope of government authority. To the extent it 
recognizes property rights through positive law, a government 
willingly accepts limits on its power in relation to that property and 
commits to protecting it (and should the government act arbitrarily it 
will surrender its legitimacy).100 In this way the right to property 
might be understood as an internal restriction on the scope of 
government authority, dependent, as Madison observed, on positive 
law. In contrast, religious freedom, as framed by the discussion in 
the prior Section, provides an external restriction, limiting the scope 
of government authority. This formulation is to some extent another 
way of expressing Rakove’s distinction between “procedural” rights 
and religious freedom.101
There is a case to be made, however, that this distinction is 
increasingly anachronistic. Consider again Jennifer Nedelsky’s 
treatment of the roles that religious liberty and property rights played 
in the design of the Constitution.102 Nedelsky suggests that two 
factors help explain the greater significance given to property. First, 
while religious freedom need not necessarily lead to deep divisions 
in a society, property will necessarily be distributed unequally, 
98. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (discussing the first clause of Magna Carta, which declares 
that “the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its 
liberties unimpaired”) (quoting J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA App. IV, p. 317, cl. 1 
(1965)). 
99. LOCKE, supra note 45, at § 138 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at § 222.
101. See RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 312.
102. See NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 210. 
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creating potential conflict.103 As Madison wrote in Federalist Number 
10, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the 
various and unequal distribution of property.”104 Second, at the time 
of the Constitution’s drafting it was considered unlikely that the 
federal legislature would concern itself in any significant way with 
questions of religion, instead leaving such matters to the states.105
While these factors may have shaped the debates and decisions of the 
Framers, they seem quaint today. Americans practice many more 
religions than at the time of the Constitution’s drafting, and a 
significant share practice no religion at all, suggesting an increased 
potential for deep division.106 And the growth of the administrative 
state has led to frequent involvement of the federal government with 
matters of religion, particularly in recent years.107 Accordingly, while 
rights to possess and use property—to the extent they dictate the 
distribution of scarce resources—might naturally seem more 
103. See id. at 211.
104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
105. See NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 211 (“[I]t seemed possible for a 
government, the federal government in particular, simply to have nothing to do with 
religion.”); see also RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 314-15 (asserting that, for Madison, 
“[w]hile government could safely abstain from religious matters, it could never 
avoid regulating the ‘various and interfering interests’ of a modern society; and any 
legislative decision would necessarily affect the rights of one class of property 
holders or another”).
106. See Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV.
481, 520 (2017) (discussing how significant increase, since Founding, in number
and variety of religious denominations creates significantly more opportunities for 
conflict).
107. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 839, 877 (2014) (“The United States is probably the most religiously 
diverse nation on the planet, and it is pervasively regulated by multiple layers and 
branches of government. Issues about the free exercise of religion arise whenever 
one of these diverse religious practices comes into conflict with one of these equally 
diverse laws or administrative practices.”); see also Philip Hamburger, Exclusion 
and Equality: How Exclusion from the Political Process Renders Religious Liberty 
Unequal, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1919-20 (2015) (asserting that “the growth 
of federal administrative power . . . leaves Americans, including religious 
Americans, no opportunity to vote for or against their administrative lawmakers[,]” 
excludes religious Americans from the political process, and “threatens religious 
equality”); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty 
and Spheres, 44 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 79, 82 (2009) (“The 
growth in scope of both religious activity and governmental power ensure that 
religious entities will be increasingly important, and that they will be in greater 
tension with various regulatory authorities.”). 
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rivalrous in nature,108 the exercise of religious freedom is 
increasingly perceived as a potential source of conflict (and cost to 
others).109
This potential for conflict creates challenges for traditional 
divisions between the private and public realms (and for any attempt 
to situate religious freedom in the former and property rights in the 
latter). To the extent that property rights are distinguished from other 
rights, such as speech and religion, on the basis that the latter sort of 
rights are “private freedoms that the state neutrally abides,”110 this 
distinction becomes less convincing if the categorization of religious 
freedom as a “private freedom” is rejected. As Muñoz observes, the 
“natural rights jurisdictional framework” embraced by Madison and 
Jefferson has over time given way to the “moral autonomy 
exemptionism” adopted by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner 
and subsequent cases.111 These decisions, Muñoz argues, gradually 
subsumed claims related to freedom of worship into an exemption 
regime, as the Court “quietly eviscerated the framers’ categorical, 
jurisdictional protection for the nonbelief elements of the natural 
right of religious liberty.”112 Unlike the jurisdictional account, this 
view does not deny the state the ability to restrict religious freedom, 
instead calling simply for a balancing of competing interests in 
determining whether an exemption should be conferred and in the
process “transform[ing] the idea of limited government.”113 Muñoz’s 
compelling interpretation of the current state of free exercise rights 
raises questions for the claim that religious freedom, as it is currently 
108. See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 31 (“Scarcity, as philosophers from 
Hume to Rawls have pointed out, is a presupposition of all sensible talk about 
property.”); see also Freyfogle, supra note 5, at 78-81 (“[P]roperty can enhance 
particular forms of liberty, but only at the expense of constraining other forms of 
liberty.”).
109. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 
2516, 2554 (2014). 
110. Underkuffler, supra note 20, at 313, 322 (“The classic liberal model of 
individual rights, in which the state must be ‘hands off’ and all can enjoy, might 
describe—and justify—the protection of speech, religion, or other such freedoms. It 
does not describe—or justify—the protection of property.”); see also NEDELSKY,
supra note 3, at 153 (“In ways very different from, say, freedom of religion, 
property requires positive governmental action.”). 
111. See Muñoz, supra note 79, at 369, 375-76.
112. Id. at 376 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 533 (1993), which declared that only “a law targeting religious beliefs as 
such is never permissible”). 
113. Id. at 379-80.
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understood, is significantly distinguishable from property rights 
allocated by the state. 
To the extent that either right is understood exclusively as the 
product of positive law, this suggests a broader set of critiques 
regarding the capacity for either right to independently provide a 
check on government power and a source of protection for other 
rights. Relatedly, and of particular importance for the discussion that 
follows, there are significant reasons to question whether the 
individual exercise of these (or any) rights, regardless of their source, 
is sufficient to restrain government action and strengthen other 
individual rights. A libertarian ideal of the isolated individual taking 
refuge from coercion by exiting society and taking shelter in private 
property rests upon what Eduardo Peñalver, discussing property 
specifically, has termed a “singularly implausible understanding of 
human nature and the dynamics of human communities.”114 To the 
extent that they depict social life as a subjective preference and 
individual choice, such claims ignore the undeniably social or 
communal character of both property and religious freedom (and 
religion itself for that matter).115 Similarly, with regards to religious 
freedom, Michael McConnell has emphasized the importance of the 
First Amendment’s choice of the words “free exercise of religion” 
rather than “rights of conscience.”116 McConnell argues that 
“‘conscience’ emphasizes individual judgment, while ‘religion’ also 
encompasses the corporate or institutional aspects of religious 
belief.”117 The term “religion” is often associated, in its origins, with 
114. Peñalver, supra note 5, at 1972.
115. See id. at 1900, 1917-18 (describing property as “product of human 
cooperation,” which both presupposes and facilitates interdependency, cooperation, 
and shared responsibility); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 365 (contending that 
property is not simply a bulwark of individualism, but instead an “intensely social” 
institution that “mixes independence and cooperation”). In a similar vein, Jedediah 
Purdy, discussing Blackstone’s account of the primacy of property among social 
institutions, has argued that “[a] story in which property comes first really puts 
something else first: sociability, a human propensity to form attachments and 
cooperative relationships outside and preceding formal legal structures.” PURDY,
supra note 5, at 4.
116. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
the Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1489 (1990).
117. Id. at 1490. McConnell’s definition of conscience would seem to 
inadequately account for the role communities play in the formation of individual 
conscience. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary is the Right of Assembly?,
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1406 (2012) (discussing “relational dimension of 
conscience” and the role that “communities of discernment” play in its formation). 
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the Latin religare, which signifies a binding together, suggesting the 
communal nature of a significant share of religious exercise.118
The communal character of both property rights and religious 
freedom, which is discussed further in Part II, suggests that the 
foundational role attributed to these two rights is decidedly more 
plausible if we give adequate attention to the role certain normative 
communities, enabled by these rights, play as a bulwark for 
individual rights more generally. To the extent that an assertion of an 
individual property right (or any right) is dependent upon the state—
through its courts, legislature, or police—for vindication, the 
capacity of isolated individuals exercising these rights to effectively 
limit intrusions by the state on rights more generally is inadequate.119
For even if we accept a view that government is “constrained by the 
independently established rights of the individuals subject to it,”
there remains a need to consider, practically speaking, what is 
necessary to ensure that government does not overstep these 
bounds.120 This includes, in the political realm, a need for collective 
action, harnessed and channeled by certain communal structures and 
institutions. Property rights and religious freedom, then, play a more 
indirect role as foundations by fostering such communities, which in 
turn provide buffers between the individual and the state and enable 
more effective self-governance and, when necessary, political 
dissent. I explore these themes further in the next Part. 
II. PROPERTY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS CONSTITUTIVE RIGHTS 
This Part places into conversation two sets of scholarship that 
emphasize communal aspects of property rights and religious 
118. But see Sarah F. Hoyt, The Etymology of Religion, 32 J. AM. ORIENTAL 
SOC’Y 126, 126 (1912) (noting that while “[t]he connection of the word religion
with religare, to bind, has usually been favored by modern writers,” there are 
reasons to doubt this association).
119. See NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 50, 250 (asserting that the claim that 
property decentralizes power rests upon a myth as it “hides the role the state plays in 
allocating that power through its legal rules of property and contract and in 
supporting that power by punishing anyone who refuses to obey those rules”); see 
also ELY, supra note 6, at 122-23 (discussing how progressives in the early 
twentieth century rejected the Lockean view of property as a prepolitical right, 
framing property rights instead as a societal creation with a “contingent and 
changing nature”); Peñalver, supra note 5, at 1900 (“[A]ll but the most die-hard 
proponents of property as exit admit that property is a social institution that could 
not survive without the coercive power of some community, typically the state.”).
120. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 138 (comparing theories of Locke and 
Nozick on property rights as “historical entitlements”). 
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freedom respectively: the human flourishing account of property, 
developed most fully by Gregory Alexander and Eduardo 
Peñalver,121 and institutional accounts of religious liberty.122 These 
sets of scholarship, which have not previously been discussed 
together in the legal literature, share similar underlying premises, 
including the social nature of human beings and human dependence 
on communal structures for the exercise of individual rights. 
Together, I contend, these theoretical frameworks suggest that the 
right to property and religious freedom play distinct but at times 
complementary roles in relation to the formation and flourishing of 
normative communities. These communities can, in turn, bolster 
individual rights more generally. As such, they provide a foundation 
for other rights in the second and third manners discussed in Part I: 
by limiting state power and nurturing the conditions necessary for 
the exercise of rights more generally.
This Part begins by briefly introducing these two sets of 
scholarship, focusing on the similar normative premises upon which 
they rely. Building in part on this scholarship, I argue that property 
rights and religious freedom play distinct roles in the constitution of 
normative communities. I then examine the relationship between 
such communities and both individual identity formation and the 
development of important democratic virtues. Finally, I discuss how 
these communities also play an important role in challenging the 
state and vindicating individual rights. 
A. Social Beings and Communal Contexts
In recent years scholars have developed more communal 
accounts of property rights and religious liberty. In both instances 
these rely in part upon the premise that human beings are inherently 
social and dependent upon social networks and communal 
institutions.123 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights similarly 
121. See infra notes 127-141 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 142-150 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 24, at 760-61 (discussing reliance upon 
Aristotelian conception of human beings as social and political animals); Alexander 
& Peñalver, supra note 24, at 134 (proposing a “conception of community [that] 
rests upon a thick[] conception of the good human life . . . [and] builds on the 
Aristotelian notion that the human being is a social and political animal, not a self-
sufficient one”); Garnett, supra note 22, at 274 (“The freedom of religion is not only 
lived and experienced through institutions, it is also protected and nourished by 
them.”); Peñalver, supra note 5, 1911-19 (discussing arguments for the “profoundly 
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emphasizes the importance of community, “in which alone the free 
and full development of [human] personality is possible.”124 The fact 
that humans are inherently social is widely accepted in the scientific 
literature.125 Nonetheless, prevalent arguments for the foundational 
status of these two rights emphasize their individual exercise, 
championing the lone voice of conscience or the solitary individual 
exiting society and avoiding coercion by retreating to her private 
property.126
Analyzing these two sets of scholarship together reveals 
intriguing overlaps in their accounts of both the role each right plays 
in the formation of normative communities and the part those 
communities in turn play in supporting the exercise of individual 
rights. Building on this scholarship, I argue that the exercise of 
property rights and religious freedom by and within communities 
provides a more plausible foundation and bulwark for individual 
rights more generally. 
In the property context, Gregory Alexander and Eduardo 
Peñalver have developed a theory of property rights grounded in a 
commitment to a particular notion of human flourishing.127 Their 
account relies upon an “Aristotelian” or “ontological” conception of 
community and of human beings as naturally social and political, 
social nature of human beings” and the role of property “in facilitating healthy social 
life”).
124. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Gen. Assemb., 3d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (1948).
125. See, e.g., Simon N. Young, The Neurobiology of Human Social 
Behaviour: An Important but Neglected Topic, 33 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE
391, 391-92 (2008) (“Humans are inherently social. . . . Group behaviour is an 
important component of human social behaviour and may differ in some ways from 
dyadic interactions.”). “The utilitarian and individualistic view of biology that was 
characteristic of the 1970s is giving way to a more prosocial picture of evolution: 
arguments for altruism and cooperation are today made in agreement with the 
mechanisms of natural selection and no longer against it.” Maurizio Meloni, How 
Biology Became Social, and What It Means for Social Theory, 62 SOC. REV. 593, 
595 (2014) (citations omitted).
126. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
127. See Alexander & Peñalver, Properties of Community, supra note 24, at 
135 (“The Aristotelian conception of human beings as social and political animals 
operates for us as part of a substantive understanding of what it means to live a 
distinctively human life and to flourish in a characteristically human way.”). See 
generally Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Introduction, in PROPERTY 
AND COMMUNITY (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010);
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1045-47
(2011); Alexander, supra note 24, at 745.
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rather than self-sufficient and independent.128 Individuals depend 
upon “a particular web of social relationships . . . to develop the 
distinctively human capacities that allow us to flourish.”129 Most 
important among these is the “capacity to discern among multiple 
available life horizons.”130 Freedom and autonomy, which would 
seem particularly solitary interests, are, Alexander and Peñalver 
argue, only meaningful “within a vital matrix of social structures and 
practices” and depend upon, among other things, an “institutional 
context”131 and “communal infrastructure.”132 This dependence 
engenders “an obligation to participate in and support the social 
networks and structures that enable us to develop those human 
capabilities that make human flourishing possible.”133 These 
capabilities include “capacities to engage in practical reasoning, to 
participate in the social life of the community, and to make decisions 
about how to live our lives.”134 Amartya Sen, upon whose 
128. Alexander, supra note 24, at 760 (“The ontological conception stresses 
the fact that although human beings value and strive for autonomy, dependency and 
interdependency are inherent aspects of the human condition.”). See ALEXANDER &
PEÑALVER, supra note 68, at 80-101 (2012) (outlining theory rooted in the work of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas). 
129. Alexander, supra note 24, at 761.
130. See id. at 762. 
131. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 68, at 90; see also Gregory S. 
Alexander, Five Easy Pieces: Recurrent Themes in American Property Law, 38 U.
HAW. L. REV. 1, 9 (2016) (“Individual autonomy can be acquired only within a vital 
matrix of social structures and practices. Its continued existence and exercise
depends upon a richly social, cultural, and institutional context, and the free and 
autonomous individual must rely upon others to provide this context.”). See id. at 8-
9 (arguing that developing autonomy, one end of private property, depends in part 
upon relationships with others).
132. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 68, at 87. Although they suggest 
that this communal infrastructure might exist at the societal level, rather than the 
level of particular groups, Alexander and Peñalver contend that “living within a 
particular sort of society, a web of particular kinds of social relationships, is a 
necessary condition for humans to be able to develop the distinctively human 
capacities that allow us to flourish.” See id. at 87-88. 
133. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 24, at 139, 143 (arguing that 
individuals depend upon communities “not only for our physical survival but also 
for our ability to function as free and rational agents”). Alexander and Peñalver 
build upon Aquinas’s thought, particularly his emphasis on the duty to love one’s 
neighbor as oneself, which “requires us to support the social and material 
preconditions for their (and our own) flourishing.” ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra 
note 68, at 85.
134. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 24, at 135, 142 (arguing that 
“authentic, robust freedom” must include “the capacity to make meaningful choices 
among alternative life horizons”). 
510 Michigan State Law Review 2017
capabilities approach Alexander and Peñalver rely, defines a 
capability as “a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the 
freedom to achieve various lifestyles).”135 Martha Nussbaum, who, 
with Sen, pioneered the capabilities approach, has acknowledged her 
own use of “the language of rights, or the related language of liberty 
and freedom, in fleshing out the account of the basic capabilities.”136
This suggests that capabilities, at least in part, might be framed as 
rights, or that we might infer a right to the resources necessary to 
develop certain capabilities.137
As such, Alexander and Peñalver’s theoretical framework can 
be interpreted in a way that suggests that property rights play a 
foundational role for other rights, but that this role is mediated by 
particular social structures and by the fulfillment of duties inherent in 
those rights. Put another way, communal structures exist in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship with individual rights. Communal 
structures both enable the development of conditions necessary for 
the exercise of individual rights and depend upon the recognition of 
individual rights.138 Private property, in turn, facilitates social 
135. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75 (1999). See Amartya 
Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 270, 273 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (“[H]uman capabilities 
constitute an important part of individual freedom.”).
136. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 273, 277 (1997) (“[R]ights play an increasingly large role inside the account of 
what the most important capabilities are.”).
137. Sen himself rejects an attempt to subsume capabilities entirely within 
human rights (or vice versa). Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J.
HUM. DEV. 151, 163 (2005). But he acknowledges that human rights can be framed 
“as rights to certain specific freedoms” and that “capabilities can be seen, broadly, 
as freedoms of particular kinds.” Id. at 152. This suggests a basic connection 
between the two concepts. However, Sen further emphasizes the need to distinguish 
between two aspects of freedom, “opportunity” and “process,” and contends that 
“[w]hile the opportunity aspect of freedoms would seem to belong to the same kind 
of territory as capabilities, it is not at all clear that the same can be said about the 
process aspect of freedom.” Id. 
138. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 24, at 147 (“[S]ome exclusive control 
over resources is necessary in order to facilitate the capability of sociality.”). As 
Jeremy Waldron observes, even if one accepts that “social life and social 
responsibility are the most important part of what it is to be human,” a theorist of 
rights can still maintain that individual interests must be protected so that individuals 
are capable of fulfilling their social responsibilities and participating in a
community. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 104. 
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interactions, and land and other resources play a role in the 
constitution of social groups.139
The “comprehensive approach” to property proposed by Laura 
Underkuffler, another prominent voice in the progressive property 
movement, similarly emphasizes the vital importance of a social and 
collective context for the development of individual autonomy.140
This collective context provides a source of both “support and 
restraint” for a “broad range of human liberties” included within the 
concept of property.141
With regards to religious liberty, in recent years a group of 
scholars has similarly emphasized the need for careful reflection on 
the distinct institutions through which individuals exercise First 
Amendment rights broadly speaking, the concomitant need to 
provide legal protections for these institutions, and the important role 
these institutions play in fostering and creating opportunities for the 
exercise of specific rights.142 At times these scholars highlight a 
structural role that certain communities and institutions play in 
mediating between the individual and the government and in serving 
as a vehicle for democratic deliberation and participation.143 Like 
Alexander and Peñalver, Paul Horwitz, a prominent proponent of this 
approach to First Amendment law, stresses the “fundamental 
139. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential 
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1989).
140. Underkuffler, supra note 20, at 147 (“By viewing a collective context as 
necessary for the definition and exercise of individual rights, the comprehensive 
approach to property forces us to rethink the relationship between the community 
and individual rights. It is a step toward rapprochement of ideas of individual 
liberty, individual autonomy, and collective life.”). Underkuffler’s “comprehensive 
approach,” which links “the broad range of human rights contained within the 
concept of property to the development of human personality . . . not only assumes a 
collective role in the definition or limitation of individual property rights, but also 
assumes a collective context for their exercise and realization.” Id. at 140.
141. Id. at 141.
142. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 91-92 (1998). See generally HORWITZ, supra 
note 22, at 264; Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: (Toward) an 
Exposition, Translation, and Defense, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 39, 45 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). 
143. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 84 (discussing “infrastructural 
nature of First Amendment institutions”); Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, 
Church Autonomy, and the Structure of Freedom, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 267, 269 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 
2010) (describing “right to church autonomy” as “a means—a structural 
mechanism—for protecting both the freedom of religion and human rights more 
generally”).
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reality—that life is social and institutional” and argues in support of 
“mak[ing] that reality a more important and more easily recognized 
part of First Amendment law.”144 Horwitz defines First Amendment 
institutions as “those institutions that are foundational to our lives as 
social beings, as citizens and participants in our collective culture.”145
These institutions both equip individuals for social life and give that 
life meaning.146 More generally, this scholarship is animated by an 
intuition that certain rights, particularly rights of expression, are 
dependent upon “the existence and flourishing of, certain 
institutions.”147 In the religious freedom context the concept is 
variably referred to as the “freedom of the church”148 and 
“institutional free exercise,”149 among other terms.  
The Supreme Court unanimously embraced a version of 
institutional free exercise rights in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.150 That decision, to which I 
return in Section II.D, rejected the position that religious institutions 
could only invoke a right to freedom of association akin to that of 
secular groups, declaring that “the text of the First 
Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”151 It is worth noting that the Court’s decision relied in 
part upon a series of earlier decisions resolving intra-church disputes 
over property.152 However, although those earlier cases involved 
disputes over control of church property, they turned on the church’s 
144. HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 84.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Garnett, supra note 22, at 274. 
148. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 96, at 268. See generally Garnett, supra 
note 22; Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 59, 61 (2013).
149. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, 
Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1207 
(2009).
150. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). In Hosanna-Tabor the Court recognized “a 
‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, which precludes 
application of [employment discrimination] legislation to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.” Id. at 
188. 
151. Id. at 173.
152. See id. at 185-87 (discussing church property cases); see also Carl H. 
Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: 
Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 168, 193 (2012) (“In 
Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court took a discrete line of cases involving 
religious disputes and church property and enlarged on it so as to give rise to a full-
throated protection of religious institutional autonomy.”). 
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freedom to select its own leaders, an internal decision crucial to 
communal identity.153
My analysis in the remainder of Part II and most of Part III will 
focus on communities at the nexus of property rights and religious 
liberty. That is, it will emphasize the role of property rights in the 
lives of religious communities and the synergies between property 
rights and religious liberty in the set of examples discussed in 
Section III.A. Although I emphasize the interaction of property rights 
and religious liberty in the context of communities, I will at times 
throughout the remainder of the Article suggest related insights 
regarding the property rights of non-religious communities and the 
interaction of property rights and religious liberty for individuals, 
topics I hope to explore further in future work. 
B. Normative Communities and Individual Identity 
In his essay Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover emphasized 
the role that property law and the Free Exercise Clause (as well as 
the freedom of contract and corporation law) play in creating 
boundaries that enable insular communities to develop distinct 
ideologies and to constitute “an integrated world of obligation and 
reality from which the rest of the world is perceived.”154 Cover 
discussed, among other examples, the experience of Anabaptist 
communities, as described in the briefs filed before the Supreme 
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder.155 As he observed, the Amish and 
Mennonites framed their communities and religious commitments in 
both spiritual and spatial terms: “The image is one of a dedicated, 
sacred space, a refuge carved out from the general secular, legal 
space of the state.”156
Anabaptist communities might be deemed outliers, firmly 
committed to a rejection of (and partial physical isolation from) 
many elements of the secular world readily embraced by most 
153. See, e.g., Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) 
(declaring that a religious organization’s freedom to select its clergy has “federal 
constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state 
interference”).
154. See Cover, supra note 21, at 30-31.
155. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See Cover, supra note 21, at 29 (“There exists no 
Amish religion apart from the concept of the Amish community. A person cannot 
take up the Amish religion and practice it individually.”).
156. Cover, supra note 21, at 30.
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religious individuals.157 Yet the vision of religious communities as 
sources of distinct normative commitments possesses broader 
relevance. As Justice Brennan would later declare, drawing on 
Cover’s article, “For many individuals, religious activity derives 
meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious 
community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of 
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation
of individuals.”158 More recently, Justice Alito remarked that 
“[t]hroughout our Nation’s history, religious bodies have been the 
preeminent example of private associations that have ‘act[ed] as 
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the 
State.’”159
These passages suggest a set of related insights. First, free 
exercise and the right to property play significant roles in enabling 
the formation of normative communities.160 Second, these 
communities can support the formation of individual identity and the 
exercise of individual rights.161 Justice Brennan made this last point 
explicitly when he stated: “Furtherance of the autonomy of religious 
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.”162
Third, religious communities are an example of private associations 
that—as “critical buffers between the individual and the power of the 
157. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 (“Old Order Amish communities today are 
characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church 
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence.”).
158. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Karl 
Barth, The Christian Community and the Civil Community, in COMMUNITY, STATE 
AND CHURCH 149 (1960)). See Cover, supra note 21, at 8-14; Douglas 
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church 
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 
(1981) (“Religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They 
exercise their religion through religious organizations, and these organizations must 
be protected by the [Free Exercise] clause.”).
159. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 619 (1984)). 
160. See Laycock, supra note 107 (discussing how the Free Exercise Clause 
helps establish normative communities); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and 
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 994 (1982) (discussing how property rights help 
lead to normative communities).
161. See Witte, supra note 13, at 718-19 (arguing that the state alone cannot 
protect rights and that instead “mediating structures,” including religious 
institutions, “play a vital role in the cultivation and realization of rights”). 
162. Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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[s]tate”163—are more likely to limit that power than isolated 
individuals exercising their rights. 
While religious freedom plays a particularly important role for 
a subset of private associations, the freedom to associate more 
generally is, as the Supreme Court has remarked, “largely dependent 
on the right to own or use property.”164 A rich literature examines the 
relationship between property and personal identity. The strongest 
statement of this relationship is Margaret Radin’s personhood theory 
of property.165 Radin draws upon a Hegelian notion of property to 
argue for an understanding of property entitlements grounded in the 
concept of personhood.166 This perspective, Radin contends, suggests 
a need to place property rights along a continuum “from fungible to 
personal,” depending upon their relationship to personhood, with 
entitlements “closely connected [to] personhood” entitled to stronger 
protection.167 In an analogous manner, property can play a crucial 
role in institutional and community identity formation, with 
particular pieces of property playing distinctly important roles in the 
life of a community.168
But how does the communal or institutional exercise of both 
these rights further not only communal and individual identity, but 
also the exercise of other individual rights? I would suggest that it is 
by supporting the formation and flourishing of civil society groups 
163. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring).
164. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (upholding 
injunction that prohibited city granting segregated private schools exclusive access 
to public recreational facilities).
165. See Radin, supra note 160, at 994; see also C. Edwin Baker, Property 
and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PENN. L. REV. 741, 
747 (1986) (“The personhood function of property is to protect people’s control of 
the unique objects and the specific spaces that are intertwined with their present and 
developing individual personality or group identity.”).
166. See Radin, supra note 160, at 992-96.
167. Id. at 986 (“[R]ights near one end of the continuum—fungible property 
rights—can be overridden in some cases in which those near the other—personal 
property rights—cannot be. This is to argue not that fungible property rights are 
unrelated to personhood, but simply that distinctions are sometimes warranted 
depending upon the character or strength of the connection.”). See Underkuffler, 
supra note 20, at 27 (suggesting that protection afforded to a particular right may 
depend in part upon whether the object of the right is fungible).
168. See Radin, supra note 160, at 977-78 (discussing Hegelian personality 
theory and noting potential political implications for group claims to certain 
resources, including property); see also Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 24, at 128 
(“The nexus between theories of property and community is perhaps tightest in 
Hegelian property theory, where property practically stands in the place of the 
individual herself.”).
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distinct from, and at times at odds with, the state. These groups carve 
out the space—both literally and figuratively—within which 
important social norms and virtues are fostered and individual 
identities are shaped.169 They also provide a more secure base for 
challenging the state on the basis of those distinct normative 
commitments.170
A diverse range of social interactions can give rise to 
communities that foster these norms and virtues, which in turn can 
support the broader recognition and protection of individual rights.171
These communities do so in two seemingly contradictory ways: by 
instilling certain democratic virtues, including respect for the rights 
and interests of others,172 and, at times, by strengthening efforts to 
challenge public norms in the name of vindicating individual rights, 
which I discuss in more detail in the next Section.173
At one extreme, commercial interactions, facilitated by 
personal property rights, can serve as “a moderating, socializing 
phenomenon,” a point emphasized by Montesquieu, Hume, and 
others.174 For Hume these commercial interactions give rise to a 
“natural progress of human sentiments,” including a greater regard 
for justice and a recognition of that virtue’s utility for mutually 
advantageous interactions.175 As Carol Rose has noted, Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers sought to transform the sin of avarice into a 
virtuous and civilizing concern for the social interest through 
commercial transactions, as “commerce requires one to focus not on 
169. The role I propose here is akin to one that John Inazu ascribes to the 
right of assembly in Liberty’s Refuge, his illuminating analysis of that right. INAZU,
supra note 39, at 5. According to Inazu, the right of assembly “provides a buffer 
between the individual and the state that facilitates a check against centralized 
power. It acknowledges the importance of groups to the shaping and forming of 
identity.” Id.
170. See generally infra Subsection III.A.3 (discussing churches in the 
sanctuary movement).
171. See INAZU, supra note 39, at 3-4. 
172. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 24, at 140 (asserting that 
communities serve a vital role in shaping the “social norms” necessary for a society 
marked by “equality, dignity, respect, and justice as well as freedom and 
autonomy”). 
173. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
174. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 62 (discussing Montesquieu and 
Hume).
175. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
21-25 (1777). See JENNIFER A. HERDT, PUTTING ON VIRTUE: THE LEGACY OF THE 
SPLENDID VICES 310 (2008) (discussing how, for Hume, “virtues required for life in 
society,” including justice, “evolv[e] gradually in the course of social interaction”). 
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others’ slights to one’s own honor, but rather on satisfying the 
others’ wants and interests.”176
By enabling participation in commerce and engagement in the 
market with people of diverse backgrounds, property rights can 
render individuals more tolerant and prone to respect rights 
generally.177 This is, of course, a rather attenuated conception of both 
virtue and community, driven in significant part by self-interest.178
For virtuous action requires not just the performance of specific 
outward acts, but also a particular inner disposition and a proper 
reason for action.179 Nonetheless, this account suggests one 
mechanism through which social interactions facilitated by property 
rights can enable—whether truly virtuous or not—sentiments 
inclined towards a respect for the interests and rights of others. 
Engagement in commerce can also help foster traits of industry and 
initiative long deemed necessary for self-government.180
The contention that property regimes can give rise to virtuous 
conduct and the traits necessary for self-governance has parallels in 
176. Rose, supra note 11, at 352.
177. See id. at 353-54 (discussing Tocqueville’s account of commerce as a 
“civilizing institution” in mid-nineteenth century America). 
178. For an excellent treatment of this and other tensions in historical 
accounts of virtue and the process of its acquisition, see generally HERDT, supra note 
175, at 306-08. For a discussion of how land use decision making can foster virtues 
including industry, justice, and humility, see Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 876-86 (2009).
179. See Peñalver, supra note 178, at 864-65.
180. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 62 (noting that, for Scottish social 
theorists of the eighteenth-century, commerce “promoted the common welfare by 
stimulating the individual initiative and industry that was understood as 
indispensable to the moral personality that itself was indispensable to the 
maintenance of a virtuous republic”); PURDY, supra note 5, at 112-13 (analyzing 
responsibility as constitutive of freedom and connected to property through 
freedom); WALDRON, supra note 1, at 310-12 (discussing the claim that recognition 
of private property rights, which grant an individual control over a particular 
resource, can encourage responsible management of those resources); Alexander, 
supra note 73, at 1269-70 (discussing the argument that “a regime of private 
ownership inculcates in individuals a sense of personal responsibility because they 
realize that they must effectively manage their own property if they are to satisfy 
their own needs”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 355 (1967) (discussing how private ownership encourages careful 
stewardship); Rose, supra note 11, at 364 (discussing how property functions as “an 
educative institution” that “reward[s] the character traits needed not only for 
commerce but also for self-government”). Alexander notes that for Hume and other 
Scottish writers, a dynamic and fluid commercial society helped avoid the recreation 
of feudal hierarchies, thereby promoting individual autonomy. ALEXANDER, supra 
note 4, at 62.
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the context of free exercise rights and the role of religious 
communities. During the Founding period, religious communities 
were seen as a primary source of the virtues and norms necessary for 
democratic governance.181 Writing a little less than a century later, 
Alexis de Tocqueville declared that although “[r]eligion in America 
takes no direct part in the government of society . . . it must 
nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of the political institutions 
of that country; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it 
facilitates the use of free institutions.”182 Normative communities can 
bolster protections for individual rights not only by instilling 
important democratic virtues that support a general commitment to 
rights. At important points in history, such communities have also 
sought to vindicate individual rights by acting, on the basis of deep-
seated normative commitments, in opposition to the state.183 Such 
dissent can play an important role in protecting individual rights, as 
the next Section discusses.  
C. Normative Communities and Challenges to the State
As the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray argued, 
discussing churches in particular, normative communities can play 
an important role in limiting the reach of government and 
“mobilizing the moral consensus of the people and bringing it to bear 
upon the power.”184 By aggregating the efforts of a multitude of 
181. See Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom 
Legislation, and Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 430 (1999) (“The 
Framers believed . . . that respecting [the communal norms of religious groups] 
played a crucial role in fostering virtue among the citizenry.”); Timothy L. Hall, 
Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87, 106-
07 (1992) (“Eighteenth-century Americans generally agreed that religion was a 
principal social actor in the formation of civic virtue.”).
182. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334 (Henry Reeve 
trans., 7th ed. 1847); see also AMAR, supra note 94, at 45 (“[T]he free-exercise 
clause protected not simply the ‘private’ worship of an individual, but also the 
nongovernmental yet ‘public’ (Tocqueville’s word) education of citizens—the very 
foundation of democracy.”); Horwitz, supra note 107, at 103 (discussing 
Tocqueville’s linking of “‘religious associations’ influence in forming the moral 
character and political development of the nation with a vibrant conception of civil 
freedom and church-state separation”).
183. See infra Section II.C.
184. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204-05 (1960) (declaring that “the 
Church stood . . . between the body politic and the public power, not only limiting 
the reach of the power over the people, but also mobilizing the moral consensus of 
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individuals and targeting those efforts toward a collective goal, 
communal institutions provide a more robust counterpoint to the 
state than do isolated individual actors, particularly in the political 
sphere. 
Both property rights and religious freedom play important 
historical roles in the context of certain claims involving privacy and 
the rights of assembly and association for such dissenting groups. 
The relationship between these rights is reflected in the development 
of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of searches and seizures, 
which grants special mention to protections for “papers.”185 As Akhil 
Amar has written, this can be traced to Entick v. Carrington and its 
emphasis on special protections for searches of papers, which 
“indirectly protected values of free religious and political 
expression.”186 Explicit restrictions on searches of personal property 
served to check government power over the speech and expressive 
activity of those in opposition.187 These restrictions sought to limit 
the government’s capacity to suppress political dissension, which 
often originated in religious communities.188 Scholars have drawn a 
number of other historical links between the activities of religious 
dissenters and the recognition of a range of rights beyond religious 
freedom.189 These include the right of assembly,190 freedom of the 
press,191 and others.192
the people and bringing it to bear upon the power.”); c.f. ALEXANDER, supra note 4,
at 29 (arguing that rather than emphasize the “protection of individual freedoms 
against collective encroachment,” republican lawyers during the Founding period 
prioritized collective liberty “against aristocratic privileges and power”).
185. AMAR, supra note 94, at 75.
186. Id. at 76.
187. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (“Where the 
materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous 
exactitude.’”) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
188. See AMAR, supra note 94, at 76. 
189. Louis Henkin contends that religious dissenters, who asserted both 
individual and church rights against established churches and political authority, 
played a crucial role in the development of the idea of rights generally. See LOUIS 
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 185 (1990). Henkin sketches a narrative in which 
“religion began to see man’s needs—his religious needs, and then other needs—as 
matters of right, of entitlement under higher law.” Id. 
190. See INAZU, supra note 39, at 24-25 (discussing how trial of William 
Penn and other Quakers—“on the charge that their public worship constituted an 
unlawful assembly”—was invoked in the First Congress in support of including the 
right of assembly in the Bill of Rights); see also AMAR, supra note 94, at 245 
(discussing how during antebellum era “the core right of assembly at issue [for 
abolitionists] seems to be the right of blacks ‘to assemble peaceably on the Sabbath 
520 Michigan State Law Review 2017
Along similar lines, Samuel Moyn attributes the embrace of 
human rights discourse by many Christians in the aftermath of World 
War II, in part, to a belief that it was vital to secure an independent 
space, free from the state, in which religious communities could 
offer distinct visions of ethical life and cultivate moral action.193
Although motivated in part by self-interest, this desire to protect civil 
society generally and the exercise of religious freedom specifically in 
and through particular communities led to efforts in support of a 
broader set of human rights.194 This implies that the maintenance of 
for the worship of [the] Creator.’”); John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur 
Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 415, 416-17 (1989) (“There 
was a long British Puritan history, from the age of Milton to the 1689 Bill of Rights, 
in the course of which the civil freedoms of speech, press, and assembly arose out of 
religious agitation, not the other way round.”).
191. See McConnell, supra note 95, at 16 (discussing the connection 
between early struggles to publish religious tracts and freedom of the press).
192. See AMAR, supra note 94, at 82-83 (discussing the relationship between 
the freedom of religion—and its role in protecting opposition to government 
ideology or religion—and the origins of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination as well as the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments”). The 1780 Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts follows its recognition of a right to worship with 
the declaration that “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, 
liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to 
the dictates of his own conscience.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. II (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), observed 
that the First Amendment’s religion clauses were adopted due to factors including 
“the cruelties and punishments inflicted, by the governments of Europe for many 
ages, to compel parties to conform, in their religious beliefs and modes of worship, 
to the views of the most numerous sect.” Id.
193. SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2015) (“‘Human rights’ 
came to figure because, in the crucible of reaction before and during World War II
when they flirted with authoritarian states (or built their own), Christians learned 
that the cultivation of moral constraint depended on keeping the spiritual 
communities that offered their vision of ethical life a home partly free from the 
state.”).
194. Id. at 10-11. According to Moyn, in the aftermath of World War II, 
international human rights were increasingly appealing for religiously oriented 
conservatives fearful of totalitarian states “snuff[ing] out their civil society” as 
“rights could appear a formidable antidote to a new syndrome of state hypertrophy 
inimical to religious values.” Id. As Moyn notes in a different work, the Commission 
to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace’s Six Pillars of Peace, issued in 
1942, included a call for an international bill of rights that would give priority to 
freedom of religion. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 
53 (2010). Anna Su has argued that Roosevelt’s inclusion of religious freedom 
among his “four freedoms” reflects a similar vision of religious freedom as a “core 
component of a democratic order” and an “ideological weapon in the war against 
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such communities was deemed necessary to foster and transfer the 
ethical norms that would inform individual and communal efforts on 
behalf of such rights.195 It also suggests the driving force was a 
communal yet particularistic interest rather than a broadly egalitarian 
commitment to individual rights.196 At a minimum this could yield, 
based on self-interest, support for a broad set of individual rights. 
More hopefully, the substance of a particular community’s ethical 
norms and beliefs may include a deeply held and broadly inclusive 
respect for individual rights, which will strengthen the commitment 
to such rights in the larger society. 
The role these rights play in carving out space for the exercise 
of other rights is not simply historical. Rights of property and 
religious liberty, by supporting the development and continued 
existence of a multitude of normative communities, contribute to a 
more vibrant and pluralist civil society.197 By dispersing power more 
totalitarian Nazi Germany.” ANNA SU, EXPORTING FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
AND AMERICAN POWER 62 (2016).
195. See MOYN, supra note 194, at 10-11.
196. There are reasons to challenge this interpretation and to suggest, at the 
very least, that the embrace of rights was not purely the product of self-interest, but 
instead reflected a decision to embrace a new language consistent with historical 
antecedents. To give one example, while the Catholic Church explicitly embraced 
human rights in Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, related 
concepts can be found in much earlier church documents and theological writings. 
Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, ENCYCLICAL LETTER ¶ 9 (1963) (recognizing 
“rights and duties [that] are universal and inviolable, and therefore altogether 
inalienable”). For example, Pope Paul III’s 1537 papal bull Sublimus Dei argued 
against the enslavement of indigenous people in the Americas and the confiscation 
of their property. Although it did not discuss a concept of rights per se, it asserted 
that indigenous people possess an equal human dignity grounded in their “capacity 
to attain to the inaccessible and invisible Supreme Good and behold it face to face.”
Pope Paul III, Sublimus Dei, PAPAL BULL (1537), http://www.papalencyclicals.net/
Paul03/p3subli.htm [https://perma.cc/8NYU-5ZB7]. Brian Tierney’s work traces the 
idea of natural rights back still further to twelfth century writings. See BRIAN 
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES OF NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL 
LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625, at 43 (1997) (tracing the evolution of the 
understanding of the phrase ius naturale from a concept of objective justice to a
subjective natural right). 
197. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[G]overnment grants [property tax] exemptions to religious 
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society 
by their religious activities. Government may properly include religious institutions 
among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each 
group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential 
to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); see also Peñalver, supra note 5, at 1962 
(suggesting a theoretical shift from an emphasis on individuals shielded by an 
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broadly, such a society better shields dissenting voices from 
majoritarian whims.198 Normative communities, through the thick 
social relationships they build among their members, are more 
effective vehicles for the dispersal of power than isolated individual 
rights holders. As Madison famously outlined in Federalist No. 10, 
since the “latent causes of faction are . . . sown in the nature of man,” 
the means of relief is to address its effects, rather than its causes.199
Madison emphasized enlarging the scope of government to include 
multiple factions, such that no single faction dominates.200 A
corollary of this approach would be to strengthen protections for and 
encourage development of a broader array of normative 
communities. In Part III, I suggest a few ways in which legal 
doctrine might do so.
D. The Risk of Exclusion and Discrimination
An emphasis on the role that such communities play in support 
of individual rights prompts a few obvious critiques. First, one might 
argue that this provides little comfort to individuals who are not 
members of such a community. However, my intention is not to 
argue that the conception of community I discuss in this Part is the 
only vehicle for protecting individual rights more generally. Instead 
my point is that, to the extent one believes that the right to property 
and religious liberty play distinct roles in the recognition and 
protection of individual rights more generally, this claim is decidedly 
more plausible if we emphasize the communal exercise of these 
rights. These communities can also strengthen the individual rights 
of non-members, through the process of instilling democratic norms, 
impermeable boundary of property rights towards a focus on “preserving the ability 
of communities to employ property as a tool for creating diverse patterns of life”).
198. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“According 
protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in 
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from 
suppression by the majority.”); John Witte Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of
Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 
397 (1996) (arguing that for Eighteenth-Century Puritan and civic republican 
writers, a diverse set of institutions “provided multiple forums for religious 
expressions and actions, important bulwarks against state encroachment on natural 
liberties, particularly religious liberties, and vital sources of theology, morality, 
charity, and discipline in the state and broader community”). 
199. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
200. See id.
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through challenging and at times limiting the power of the state, and 
through furthering a commitment to pluralism generally. 
This leads to a second criticism, which is that an emphasis on 
such communities raises concerns regarding exclusion and 
discrimination.201 Consider again, in this respect, the Court’s decision 
in Hosanna-Tabor, which emphasized the ministerial exception’s 
role in preventing interference by the state in “the internal 
governance” of a religious institution and, with regards to the 
specific issue in the case, its “control over the selection of those who 
will personify its beliefs.”202 Put another way, Hosanna-Tabor 
declared that a religious institution need not proffer reasons for 
certain employment decisions, even when they might otherwise run 
afoul of employment discrimination law.203
On this reading, the limited sovereignty of religious institutions 
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor bears similarity to certain sovereignty-
based accounts of the nature of property ownership. Echoing theories 
of institutional free exercise, Larissa Katz has argued that “in the 
case of private ownership, public and private authorities are 
conceptually distinct sources of authority, neither reducible nor 
traceable to the other.”204 The authority of ownership is absolute in 
201. This is a long-standing concern; as Eric Claeys observes in an essay 
analyzing in depth Locke’s conception of private societies, Locke at points 
expressed strong criticisms of private associations. Eric R. Claeys, The Private 
Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought, 25 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 201, 203 (2008). Madison himself expressed significant concerns regarding 
“the indefinite accumulation of property . . . by ecclesiastical corporations” (and all 
corporations, for that matter). DETACHED MEMORANDA, supra note 76.
202. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 
(2012). 
203. See id.
204. Larissa Katz, Property’s Sovereignty, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.
299, 302-03, 326 (2017) (“To respect and promote property rights, from this 
viewpoint, means the vindication and perhaps even the defense of the constitutional 
choice to establish a source of authority over private relations that is separate from 
and irreducible to public authority.”). By viewing the allocation of private authority 
to property owners as “a particular political strategy, rather than a requirement of the 
rule of law or a reflection of pre-political rights,” Katz’s view of property rights 
diverges from accounts of institutional free exercise, which are prone to view this 
allocation as pre-political. Id. at 326. Katz’s sovereignty-based account bears some 
semblance to how Gregory Alexander frames the proprietarian conception of 
property in the American colonies, as the Founding charters conveyed political 
authority along with land and “the significance of ownership of property was that it 
defined the scope of authority for governing.” ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 9. They 
diverge in that on Alexander’s account those granted property in the colonial period 
were to exercise “their authority and property rights for the purpose of creating a 
524 Michigan State Law Review 2017
the sense that “owners are absolved from the normative constraints 
that legitimize public decisions. Owners are free to act on their 
private judgment about what ought to be done with a thing.”205 There 
is of course an important distinction between actions with regards to 
a thing and actions, in the context of a decision implicating the 
ministerial exception, that affect a person. But both accounts suggest 
a deference to private ordering within a separate sphere of authority 
set off by institutional free exercise rights and property rights 
(whether individual, collective, or communal) respectively. Just as 
one who freely enters another’s private property becomes subject to 
his or her private judgment regarding the use of that property, so too 
one might consent (expressly or implicitly) to the sovereign authority 
of a religious institution.206
In the property context, common interest communities or 
residential associations provide an example of private ordering to 
which courts have long been quite deferential.207 Although there is 
variation across jurisdictions, courts typically apply a reasonableness 
standard in reviewing challenges by a resident to a community 
association’s rules or a specific decision.208 Rules contained in the 
association’s originating covenants, which are a matter of public 
record, typically receive a higher level of deference, on the 
understanding that residents knowingly accepted those restrictions 
upon purchase and with the goals of promoting stability and private 
properly ordered society.” Id. In contrast, Katz argues that ownership leaves owners 
with greater latitude to act upon their private judgment and that “owners are 
absolved from the normative constraints that legitimize public decisions,” a view 
that more closely parallels conceptions of sovereignty in the area of institutional free 
exercise. Katz, supra, at 304. 
205. Katz, supra note 204, at 304.
206. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 201 (Alito, J., concurring) (“All who 
unite themselves to [a voluntary religious association] do so with an implied consent 
to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and 
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by 
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.”) 
(quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871)).
207. See Alexander, supra note 139, at 6.
208. See id. at 6 (“Courts have tended substantively to review these rules, 
applying a standard of reasonableness that requires the rules of the group to conform 
not only to the association’s own internal values but to external values as well—i.e., 
values that, in the court’s judgment, are widely shared throughout the rest of the 
polity.”); see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 8 Cal. 4th 361, 376, 
380 (1994).
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governance.209 At the same time, a review of such restrictions, while 
deferential, typically evaluates their reasonableness in light of 
significant external societal values, an approach in marked contrast 
with the Court’s treatment of a religious institution’s internal 
governance decisions in Hosanna-Tabor.210
As Gregory Alexander has observed, for residential 
associations to foster some semblance of a group identity via private 
property, individual owners must sacrifice some degree of control 
“to the extent that individual control is inconsistent with maintenance 
of the group.”211 Alexander contends, however, that for such groups 
to “realize their potential for creating community” they “must be 
held to an obligation more demanding than mere compliance with 
their own internal aspirations.”212 Reasonableness review, rather than 
some stronger form of group autonomy, achieves this goal for 
residential communities while better comporting, on Alexander’s 
account, with communitarian theory by keeping groups connected to 
one another and to the society at large.213 Granting residential 
associations a lesser degree of deference than that afforded to the 
decisions of religious groups accords with a view of property rights 
as products of positive law, in contrast to pre-political or natural 
rights of religious liberty.214
My goal here and in this Article is not to delineate with 
specificity the standards that courts should apply to the internal 
209. Paula Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review 
and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663, 669-71 (2000) (“A judicial 
posture grounded in considerations of reasonableness preserves the opportunity to 
consider the equities and protects against board abuse and unnecessary 
encroachments upon private behavior . . . the presumption of reasonableness 
afforded originating restrictions promotes stability and deters judges from 
substituting their judgment for that of the collective body.”).
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; see also Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 173.
211. See Alexander, supra note 139, at 12 (“Residential associations are a 
contemporary setting for this group-constitutive role of property and of restrictions 
on property use. Residential associations are the governance entities for territorial 
groups that are constituted with respect to particular assets, some of which are 
individually owned, others owned in common by group members. In this sense, 
these property restrictions are tied to group existence, for maintaining the character 
of the group requires that the association be able to enforce these property 
restrictions. This interpretation of residential association restrictions has guided the 
judicial reaction to recent challenges to these restrictions.”).
212. Id. at 60. 
213. See id. at 59-60.
214. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187.
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decisions of various groups. Rather my intent is to merely suggest 
that while I am arguing that the communal exercise of both religious 
liberty and property rights plays an important foundational role for 
rights generally, the extent to which the internal governance of 
particular groups should be insulated from review varies. At one end 
of the spectrum, many religious communities, which the Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor declared are entitled to “special solicitude” under 
the First Amendment, are likely to be among the thickest normative 
communities and will be recognized as possessing rights in their 
corporate or institutional form independent of the rights of individual 
members.215 At the other end we might place a common interest 
community, as well as other thinner forms of community united in 
significant part largely on the basis of some combination of spatial 
proximity, shared preferences, and utilitarian advantage, rather than a 
deep normative commitment. I still refer to these communities as 
normative, albeit in a weak sense, to the extent that, in the case of a 
homeowners association, for example, the association’s rules 
constitute shared norms.216 A variety of non-religious private groups 
and associations will fall somewhere along this spectrum. 
It is the nature of communities—to the extent that they “are 
constituted by shared commitments to some specific good”—to 
exclude, whether intentionally or not, those who do not share those 
same commitments.217 As noted, my inclination, when questions of 
exclusion and discrimination arise is towards granting greater
deference to thicker normative communities, including religious 
communities, and less protection to groups constituted largely on the 
basis of property rights. I acknowledge that exclusion has significant 
costs, but so too, as I have argued to this point, does the failure to 
protect communal and group rights, including the right to dissent 
215. See id. at 173. For a discussion of “thick” and “thin” communities, see 
Glen O. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 275-76 (1997) 
(“[S]ociologists have distinguished groups of individuals bound together by kinship, 
ethnic, or religious affinities from the looser relationships that individuals form for 
utilitarian advantage, both commercial and political.”).
216. See Alexander, supra note 139, at 5 (“The normative canon of these 
residential arrangements consists of expressly stated rules in purchasers’ deeds that 
impose a wide variety of restrictions on members’ use of their property interests 
within the development.”).
217. See id. at 52 (“One of the central dilemmas of community concerns the 
relationship between the group and the rest of society, or what I will call the paradox 
of exclusion.”).
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from prevailing norms.218 To address concerns regarding exclusion 
and discrimination in a meaningful fashion is a project for a separate 
article. However, in Section III.B, discussing conflicts between 
individual property rights and religious liberty claims and equality 
norms, I briefly sketch a contextual approach to evaluating such 
conflicts and the competing interests they reflect.219
In this Part, I have argued that the exercise of property rights 
and religious freedom by and within communities provides a more 
plausible foundation for rights more generally than the individual 
exercise of either right. The role these two rights play as foundations 
for other rights is mediated by particular social structures. These 
structures include communities that carve out a space within which 
important virtues are fostered, distinct normative commitments are 
developed and shared, and individual identities are formed.220 Such 
communities also, at times, act as important buffers between 
individuals and the state and facilitate collective action.221 They can 
also strengthen the individual rights of non-members by instilling 
democratic norms, challenging and at times limiting the power of the 
state, and furthering a commitment to pluralism more generally. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Part II argued that religious freedom and the right to property 
are best understood as foundations for other rights in a less direct 
manner than is often claimed. Highlighting the role these rights play 
in the formation of normative communities that, in turn, strengthen 
the protection of other rights, yields a number of insights for existing 
legal doctrine. In this Part, I focus on communal activities at the 
nexus of property rights and religious liberty, examining how the 
synergistic relationship of property rights and religious liberty 
suggests a reappraisal of existing legal doctrines in three different 
contexts. I then briefly turn back to individual property and religious 
218. For a fuller argument to this effect, defending robust protections for the 
right of assembly, while acknowledging the significant risks—including “racism, 
misogyny, and a parade of other evils”—that such protections pose, see John D. 
Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1446 (2012).
219. See infra Section III.B.
220. See PURDY, supra note 5, at 109; Peñalver, supra note 5, at 1900, 1917-
18; Rose, supra note 11, at 365.
221. PURDY, supra note 5, at 109 (“Without enforceable rights in resources, 
cooperation stalls or breaks down, insecurity grows, and freedom shrinks in all its 
dimensions.”).
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liberty claims to suggest how considering these rights together might 
yield new perspectives on conflicts involving equality norms. 
A. Religious Community v. State
In this Section, I apply the analysis in Part II to a few examples 
at the nexus of property rights and religious liberty. The exercise of 
property rights can play an important and often indispensable role in 
furthering communal religious exercise. Property rights and religious 
liberty together create the space within which both communal and 
individual identity is formed and perpetuated.222 These three 
examples reveal, in turn, how the communal exercise of property 
rights and religious liberty—given adequate protection in law—can 
enable the exercise of a broader set of individual rights, foster 
individual and communal autonomy and identity formation, and limit 
the power of the state. 
1. Making Space for Religious Communities and Their 
Members: RLUIPA
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) seeks in part to protect religious landowners from the 
imposition, through a land use regulation, of a substantial burden on 
religious exercise.223 RLUIPA was passed in response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.224 City of Boerne
declared portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
invalid.225 RFRA prohibits the imposition of a substantial burden on 
a person’s religious exercise, even if the burden results from a 
generally applicable law, unless the law furthers a “compelling 
governmental interest” through the “least restrictive means.”226 In 
222. See Rose, supra note 11, at 365.
223. See Infranca, supra note 23, at 1726.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). See also Marci A. Hamilton, 
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 323-24 (2003) (reviewing 
precursors to RLUIPA and legislative history). 
225. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997). Congress passed 
RFRA in response to the Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (declaring the Free 
Exercise clause alone does not bar application of a “neutral, generally applicable law 
to religiously motivated action”). 
226. § 2000bb-1(b). RFRA was intended “to restore the compelling interest 
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)[,] and Wisconsin v. 
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City of Boerne the Court struck down the application of RFRA to 
states and localities, declaring that those provisions exceeded the 
scope of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
empowers Congress to pass remedial laws to enforce the 
Amendment’s due process and equal protection provisions.227
RLUIPA represented an “unusual alliance” on behalf of 
religious property owners and prisoners, forged in part to avoid the 
problems that proved fatal for RFRA by narrowly focusing on areas 
where Congress was confident it possessed the power to legislate.228
Congress sought to avoid RFRA’s fate by limiting the new statute’s 
application to programs that receive federal financial assistance, 
regulations that affect commerce, and substantial burdens “imposed 
in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use 
regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal 
or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to 
make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the 
property involved.”229 No specific hearings were held on RLUIPA, 
but testimony regarding a failed piece of legislation, the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), is considered part of RLUIPA’s 
legislative history.230 While some of this testimony asserted that 
religious institutions faced significant challenges in the context of 
land use,231 critics argue that substantial opposition to the bill was 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)[,] and to guarantee its application in all cases where free 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107 Stat. 1488. This discussion draws in part 
on Infranca, supra note 23, at 1703-07, which provides a more detailed discussion of 
RLUIPA’s legislative history and statutory language.
227. 521 U.S. at 533-36.
228. See Zachary Bray, RLUIPA and the Limits of Religious Institutionalism,
2016 UTAH L. REV. 41, 70 (2016).
229. See § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
230. See Hamilton, supra note 224, at 334 (“No hearings were held on 
RLUIPA per se; rather, the hearings on RLPA generally addressing land use law 
were supposed to stand in as hearings in support of RLUIPA.”).
231. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
134 (1998) (statement of W. Cole Durham, Jr., Brigham Young University Law 
School) (“When I was invited to appear at this Hearing, I was asked to focus in 
particular on religious freedom issues that arise in the area of land use. In the 
balance of my remarks, I will turn to this area. In my view, the problems 
encountered by religious organizations in the area of land use are symptomatic of a 
larger set of problems that religious organizations face in the modern regulatory 
state.”).
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excluded and that religious communities faced no significant 
discrimination in the land use realm.232
Criticisms of RLUIPA’s land use provisions are grounded in
part in the perception that there is no defensible theoretical basis for 
providing additional protections for the property rights of religious 
institutions in the particular context of public land use controls.233
The statute appears instead to be the product of a convenient 
compromise and a congressional desire to do something on behalf of 
religious liberty in the limited realms left to it by the Court.234 But 
another way to interpret RLUIPA would be to say that, whether 
intentionally or not, Congress seized upon an area of distinct 
importance for religious communities and their individual members. 
Property plays a vital and unique role in the formation of 
individual and group identity.235 By severely restricting an 
institution’s ability to engage in certain uses of its property, 
particularly uses central to the development and perpetuation of the 
group’s identity, beliefs, and practices, land use regulations pose a 
232. See Bray, supra note 228, at 71 (citing scholars who question whether 
religious communities face significant discrimination in the land use realm). In a 
prior work, I argued at length in favor of an institutional approach to evaluating 
RLUIPA claims, a position that was thoughtfully critiqued by Zachary Bray in a 
recent article. See Infranca, supra note 23; see also Bray, supra note 228, at 81 (“I 
take Infranca’s account to be essentially the best and most thoughtful case that could 
be made for an institutional approach to RLUIPA, while concluding that the 
problems with an institutional approach, identified in this Article, are so significant 
that any such approach should be rejected.”). I do not have space in this Article to 
adequately respond to Professor Bray’s analysis of the potential problems with an 
institutional approach to RLUIPA. Instead, I wish to briefly suggest how the prior 
discussion in this Article might inform our understanding of RLUIPA. 
233. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, RLUIPA Is a Bridge Too Far: 
Inconvenience Is Not Discrimination, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959 (2012). 
234. See Hamilton, supra note 224, at 323.
235. A number of legal commentators have discussed the similar relationship 
between property and group identity. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. 
Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009) 
(“[C]ertain lands, resources, and expressions are entitled to legal protection as 
cultural property because they are integral to the group identity and cultural survival 
of indigenous peoples.”); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The 
Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 566 
(1995) (“[C]ultural property embodies the physical manifestation of a group’s 
identity.”); see also Alison Ledgerwood, Ido Liviatan & Peter J. Carnevale, Group-
Identity Completion and the Symbolic Value of Property, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 873, 877 
(2007) (finding “that group identity, like personal identity, can be conceptualized as 
a goal toward which group members willfully strive, and that such goal striving is 
UHÀHFWHG LQ WKH YDOXH SODFHG RQ SRWHQWLDO V\PEROV RI JURXS LGHQWLW\>@´ LQFOXGLQJ
property).
(Communal) Life, (Religious) Liberty, and Property 531
distinct risk to that institutional identity, as well as to the continued 
flourishing of often marginalized communities. Disputes over 
Muslim cemeteries236 and mosques237 reflect this reality. As an expert 
on death rituals in Islam recently declared: “This is part of a wider 
anxiety over integration and the place of Muslims in America and the 
extent to which Muslims are allowed to carve spaces in the country 
that are their own, for their own rituals and their own community.”238
Discussing the 2010 controversy over the Park51 Muslim 
community center in lower Manhattan, Winnifred Sullivan has 
observed that similar protests, fueled by “[f]ear of an immigrant 
religion,” confronted efforts to build a Catholic church just blocks 
away in 1785.239 RLUIPA reflects the important role such spaces 
play for religious communities. By facilitating the entry of such 
communities into localities where they would otherwise be excluded, 
it also provides a highly visible signal of a societal commitment to 
the free exercise of religion and minority rights more generally. 
This relationship between religious freedom and property rights
in the context of RLUIPA might be understood as akin to what 
236. See, e.g., David DeKok, Pennsylvania Township Nixes Proposed 
Islamic Cemetery, Appeal Likely, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pennsylvania-cemetery/pennsylvania-township-
nixes-proposed-islamic-cemetery-appeal-likely-idUSKBN0MK2MQ20150324 
[https://perma.cc/VY9F-5J8P ] (“Fights over proposed Islamic cemeteries have 
taken place over the past year in Las Vegas; Walpole, Massachusetts; Kuna, Idaho; 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee and Louisville, Kentucky.”); Mukhtar Ibrahim, Castle 
Rock Township Must Allow Islamic Cemetery, Judge Rules, MINN. PUB. RADIO 
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/02/01/dakota-county-
ruling-islamic-cemetery-muslim-religious-discrimination [https://perma.cc/5DHB-
QXK6]; Patrick Strickland, Plan to Create Muslim Cemetery Sparks Uproar in 
Texas City, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/
articles/2015/8/13/bid-to-develop-islamic-cemetery-sparks-uproar-in-texas-
town.html [https://perma.cc/S7GS-UE2T].
237. See Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques: Enforcing a Fundamental 
Right in Challenging Times, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 330, 345 (2012) (“While 
Muslims make up an estimated 1% to 2% of the population, 14% of RLUIPA 
investigations opened by the Civil Rights Division in RLUIPA’s first ten years 
involved mosques or Muslim schools.”).
238. Jess Bidgood, Muslims Seek New Burial Ground, and a Small Town 
Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2016 (quoting Leor Halevi, associate professor of 
history at Vanderbilt University). See Emma Green, A New Jersey Mosque Wins in a 
Religious-Discrimination Lawsuit—Over Parking Lots, THE ATLANTIC, May 30, 
2017 (reporting that local planning board, which rejected mosque proposal, “heard 
testimony that [Islamic Society of Basking Ridge’s] members were a ‘different kind 
of population instead of the normal Judeo-Christian population’”). 
239. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religion, Land, and Rights, in BUFF. LEGAL 
STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2010). 
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Timothy Zick terms “rights dynamism.”240 Zick argues that the 
Supreme Court, in a series of mid-twentieth century cases involving 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, interpreted First Amendment rights “in a
manner that highlighted their synergistic and collaborative 
relationship. . . . [R]ecognition and enforcement of expressive rights 
created public breathing space for the free exercise of religion. In 
turn, recognition of free exercise rights helped to create a stronger 
foundation for expressive rights.”241 Zick’s conception of rights 
dynamism suggests a theoretical justification for RLUIPA. Although 
the statute is typically understood in relationship to religious 
freedom, it protects religious freedom by, in part, strengthening the 
property rights of religious communities. As such the statute can be 
read to reflect an implicit recognition of the synergistic relationship 
between religious freedom and property rights, particularly in the 
context of religious communities, which, like all associations, are 
highly dependent upon physical space.242
2. Protecting Identity: Native American Sacred Land
In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Supreme Court held that compulsory 
school attendance laws could not be applied to Amish and 
Mennonite parents who, for religious reasons, refused to send their 
children to school beyond the eighth grade.243 The law was 
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause, and the Court’s opinion 
analyzed the extent to which the requirement of high school 
attendance coerced Amish individuals into acting contrary to their 
240. See Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791 (2017).
241. Id. at 836. Andre van der Walt suggested an analogous role for property 
rights in certain contexts. He offered as an example the textual protections for 
property in the South African Constitution, which, while not “systemically 
necessary” to promote the explicit right to housing, “could be relied on strategically 
to support” that separately enumerated right. AJ van der Walt, The Modest Systemic 
Status of Property Rights, 1 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 15, 104 (2014).
242. As Justice Sotomayor recently wrote in dissent in Trinity Lutheran, “A 
house of worship exists to foster and further religious exercise. There, a group of 
people, bound by common religious beliefs, comes together ‘to shape its own faith 
and mission.’” Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2029 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012)). “Within its walls, worshippers gather to 
practice and reaffirm their faith. And from its base, the faithful reach out to those not 
yet convinced of the group’s beliefs.” Id.
243. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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religious beliefs.244 The decision also relied upon the testimony of 
expert witnesses who declared that requiring high school attendance 
posed an existential threat to Amish communities.245 The Amish way 
of life, the Court declared, “is not merely a matter of personal 
preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an 
organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”246 Requiring 
secondary schooling would substantially interfere with the Amish 
child’s “integration into the way of life of the Amish faith 
community.”247 Mandatory attendance would impede the ability of 
the Amish community to impart its values and way of life.248
This language in Wisconsin v. Yoder suggests that the effect
mandatory high school attendance would have on the continued 
existence of the Amish community influenced the Court’s Free 
Exercise analysis.249 However, in its subsequent decision in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the Court declared that
Government actions that “could have devastating effects on 
traditional Indian religious practices,” but did not coerce individuals 
to act contrary to their religious beliefs, were not cognizable under 
the Free Exercise Clause.250 In dissent Justice Brennan contended 
that coerced action contrary to an individual’s religious beliefs does 
not “exhaust[] the range of religious burdens recognized under the 
Free Exercise Clause.” 251 He argued that Yoder turned not on the 
coercive effect of the law on individuals, but rather on the mandatory 
attendance law’s impact on “the continued survival of Amish 
communities.”252
244. See id. at 207. In Smith, the Court sought to distinguish Yoder by 
classifying it as an example of a hybrid case in which a “neutral, generally 
applicable law” implicates both the Free Exercise Clause and another constitutional 
protection, namely the “right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children.” 
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). See Yoder,
406 U.S. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free 
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain 
the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”). 
245. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209, 212, 217.
246. Id. at 216.
247. Id. at 218.
248. Id. at 211-12.
249. See id.
250. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51
(1988).
251. Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209). 
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Justice Brennan’s dissent emphasized the importance of 
specific locations for Native American religious beliefs and 
communal ceremonies: “Rituals are performed in prescribed 
locations not merely as a matter of traditional orthodoxy, but because 
land, like all other living things, is unique, and specific sites possess 
different spiritual properties and significance. Within this belief 
system, therefore, land is not fungible . . . .”253 The majority in Lyng 
asserted that to provide relief to Native Americans challenging 
specific Government actions on Government—not tribal—land 
would effectively grant the challengers “de facto beneficial 
ownership” of Government land, divesting the government of the 
right to use its own land.254 Rather than demand exclusive use and 
possession of the land in question, however, the Native American 
respondents simply asked the Government to not engage in a 
particular activity—construction of a road segment. 
The majority opinion hinted at a better way to evaluate the 
case. Discussing the government’s property rights, it concluded, 
albeit with little analysis, that “the diminution of the Government’s 
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion, 
would in this case be far from trivial.”255 This suggests that the 
claims in Lyng and similar cases should be evaluated in light of both 
free exercise and property law principles, even while acknowledging 
that the dispute arose on land owned by the federal government. 
Along these lines, Kristen Carpenter has explored a variety of ways 
in which, even in cases where they are non-owners, Indian nations 
might invoke property rights in claims involving sacred sites on 
government land.256 Recognition of the relationship between 
253. Id. at 460-61 (“Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, 
Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land.”). See Paul 
Baumgardner, Your Land Is Holy to Me: The Constitutional Battle to Access Sacred 
Sites on Public Lands, 59 J. CHURCH & STATE 205, 208 (2015) (“Stewardship of the 
natural world and right relation to the land are cardinal commitments to many 
Native American religions.”); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to 
Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
1061, 1063 (2005) (“Tribal cultures, from the time of their creation, have been 
formed, shaped, and renewed in relationship with mountains, mesas, lakes, rivers, 
and other places that are imbued with the spirituality, history, knowledge, and 
identity of the people.”).
254. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. 
255. Id. at 453 (noting that it would forbid commercial timber harvesting and 
road construction in 17,000 acres of public land). But see id. at 477 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (describing road as “marginally useful”).
256. See generally Carpenter, supra note 253.
(Communal) Life, (Religious) Liberty, and Property 535
religious liberty and property rights in the context of communities, 
and its implication for individual rights more generally, would 
strengthen such claims. It calls for an analysis similar to that 
proposed by Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lyng, one that does not 
demand a showing of coercion to establish a free exercise claim, but 
instead emphasizes the concept of interference with communal 
religious practices and identity, as the Court did in the early church 
property disputes and in Wisconsin v. Yoder.257 The provision and use 
of a physical space free from interference is one of the primary 
mechanisms through which property rights are traditionally 
understood to foster autonomy and identity formation and to promote 
freedom.258
3. Challenging the State: Sanctuary Churches
Since the election of President Donald Trump, a growing 
number of religious communities have declared themselves 
“sanctuaries” for undocumented immigrants at risk of deportation.259
Members of the New Sanctuary Movement sign a pledge that states: 
257. For example, in Kedroff, the Court emphasized the concept of 
interference in evaluating the free exercise claim, declaring that a religious 
organization’s freedom to select its clergy has “federal constitutional protection as a 
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.” Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952). See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“While I agree that 
governmental action that simply offends religious sensibilities may not be 
challenged under the [Free Exercise] Clause, we have recognized that laws that 
affect spiritual development by impeding the integration of children into the 
religious community or by increasing the expense of adherence to religious 
principles—in short, laws that frustrate or inhibit religious practice—trigger the 
protections of the constitutional guarantee.”); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218; Marc O. 
DeGirolami, Substantial Burdens Imply Central Beliefs, U. ILL. L. REV. 19, 22-23
(2016) (critiquing decision in Lyng and arguing that “interference, rather than 
coercion, is the more natural interpretation of a burden”). 
258. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 60, at 47 (discussing “highly spatialized” 
conception of the relationship between property and freedom). 
259. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as 
Trump-Era Immigrant Sanctuaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-
trump-era-immigrant-sanctuaries.html [https://perma.cc/T7QQ-MJVM] (discussing 
examples of sanctuary churches); Tatiana Sanchez, In Trump Era, Bay Area 
Churches Offer Sanctuary to Undocumented Immigrants, MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 5, 
2017, http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/02/05/in-trump-era-bay-area-churches-
offer-sanctuary-to-undocumented-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/AF6F-59VU]
(stating that “[d]ozens of Bay Area churches have declared themselves ‘sanctuary 
churches’ in recent months,” joining hundreds of others nationwide that have vowed 
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As people of faith and people of conscience, we pledge to resist the newly 
elected administration’s policy proposals to target and deport millions of 
undocumented immigrants and discriminate against marginalized 
communities. We will open up our congregations and communities as 
sanctuary spaces for those targeted by hate, and work alongside our 
friends, families, and neighbors to ensure the dignity and human rights of 
all people.260
The language of this pledge includes two particularly relevant 
components: a statement of resistance to official government policy 
and a declaration that the communities will “open up” a “sanctuary 
space.”261 This New Sanctuary Movement began as a response to the 
immigration enforcement efforts of the Bush and Obama 
administrations.262 The name references the earlier “Sanctuary 
Movement” of the 1980s, which provided shelter to undocumented 
migrants in the United States facing deportation to war-ravaged 
countries in Central America.263 At that time, over 300 local churches 
and a range of national religious bodies declared themselves 
sanctuaries, both physically harboring undocumented individuals and 
publicly declaring their intent to violate the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.264
The first church to formally declare itself a sanctuary, Tucson’s 
Southside Presbyterian Church, issued a letter that asserted the 
community’s “God-given right to aid any one fleeing from 
persecution and murder . . . [despite the fact that] [t]he current 
administration of United States law prohibits us from sheltering these 
[undocumented] refugees.”265 This declaration reflected the church 
community’s reliance on its physical property to provide sanctuary, 
to protect their most vulnerable parishioners—even if that puts them at odds with 
federal policy or law).
260. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT, http://www.sanctuarynotdeportation.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/5C3Q-C7Q8] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
261. See id.
262. Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The 
Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 71, 103 (2012).
263. See id. at 101-02 (“[A]t the time the United States government was 
denying Central American asylum applications as a matter of policy—categorizing 
refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua as ‘economic’ refugees, 
ineligible as a matter of law to receive political asylum.”).
264. Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the 
Crime of Charity under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 
122-23 (1993). 
265. Id. at 123 (quoting Letter from Rev. John Fife to William French Smith 
(Mar. 23, 1982)).
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exercise its “God-given right,” and publicly express its opposition to 
a government policy.266 Sanctuary churches did so despite the fact 
that federal courts declared their actions a felony in violation of 
Section 274(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
prohibits concealing, harboring, or shielding an undocumented 
individual.267 The provision of sanctuary, including physical shelter 
on church property, was understood as a “moral duty” undertaken, in 
part, in an effort to bring changes to existing government policy.268
As such, providers of sanctuary, both in the earlier movement and 
the most recent iteration, do not seek to conceal their actions.269
Although they might designate themselves “sanctuaries,” such 
churches cannot assure an individual who stays within their property 
will be protected from civil authorities.270 Under the Obama 
administration, churches were able to rely upon a 2011 memorandum 
from the then-Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), which declared that ICE would not, generally, conduct 
enforcement actions in certain “sensitive locations,” including 
266. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the 
Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 903, 942 (1995) (“The 
defendants in [legal actions prosecuting members of Sanctuary Movement] 
understood their Sanctuary efforts as an integral part of a religiously directed way of 
life, in which they had been able to respond to refugees with shelter and protection 
from the persecution and strife that the refugees fled.”). 
267. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 264, at 124; see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2005) (outlining criminal penalties for any person who 
“knowing[ly] or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, 
or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from 
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any 
place, including any building or any means of transportation”); Rose Cuison 
Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 141 (2008) (“Although the 
federal government initially treated the sanctuary movement of the 1980s with 
minimal resistance, it eventually prosecuted individuals who were involved with the 
network.”). 
268. Villazor, supra note 267, at 140-41.
269. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 264, at 141 (“The broadest 
contingent of sanctuary churches and workers have been engaged in the reactive, 
non-clandestine shelter of the undocumented.”) (emphasis added); Villazor, supra 
note 267, at 146 (“[T]he New Sanctuary Movement argues that their actions do not 
violate immigration laws because they are not concealing the identity of the families 
to whom they are providing shelter and assistance.”).
270. See Philip Bump, The Looming Conflict Between Trump’s Immigration 
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“churches, synagogues, mosques or other institutions of worship, 
such as buildings rented for the purpose of religious services.”271
During the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a free exercise challenge to enforcement of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s prohibition on harboring 
undocumented individuals.272 The court’s decision in Aguilar relied 
in part on a prior Fifth Circuit decision.273 In that case the court 
confronted a similar claim and found it lacked merit in part due to 
the testimony of Catholic and Methodist clergy, none of whom 
“suggested that devout Christian belief mandates participation in the 
‘sanctuary movement.’”274 The Aguilar court’s treatment of the 
defendant’s free exercise claim accords with the Supreme Court’s 
later evaluation of a free exercise claim in Employment Division v. 
Smith, which upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to 
members of the Native American Church who lost their jobs when 
they violated a generally applicable state law by using peyote during 
a religious ritual.275
The Supreme Court subsequently distinguished Employment 
Division v. Smith in Hosanna-Tabor, which, as discussed earlier, 
involved “government interference with an internal church decision 
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself,” namely a 
religious group’s selection of its ministers.276 The Court contrasted 
this internal governance decision with the issue in Smith, which 
involved “government regulation of only outward physical acts.”277
Although in Hosanna-Tabor the Court expressly limited its holding 
to a determination that the ministerial exception bars employment 
271. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Memorandum on Enforcement 
Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations, Policy No. 10029.2, (Oct. 24, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf. 
272. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (“Even assuming that appellants have proved that the 
enforcement of sections 1324 and 1325 interfered with their religious beliefs, they 
cannot escape the government’s overriding interest in policing its borders.”). Free 
exercise claims were also rejected in other cases involving the sanctuary 
movements, including American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 760-
62 (N.D. Cal. 1989), and Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 527 
(9th Cir. 1989).
273. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 694.
274. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986).
275. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872-73 
(1990).
276. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
277. Id.
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discrimination suits by a minister,278 an argument might be made that 
the decision’s logic has broader implications and provides some 
support for religious institutions seeking to challenge federal 
immigration laws. 
The primary challenge for such claims, however, is the fact that 
providing sanctuary seems to be something more readily classified as 
an “outward physical act,” rather than an “internal governance” 
decision affecting a religious community’s “right to shape its own 
faith and mission through its appointments.”279 It is here that the 
interaction of the free exercise claim and a property right might 
strengthen the religious community’s claim. While providing 
sanctuary might not be an “internal governance” decision, it does 
occur within the church’s private property and, in that sense, might 
be framed as an internal act taken pursuant to the religious 
community’s faith and mission and which in turn shapes that faith 
and mission. 
Moreover, as I suggested in a prior work, communal or 
institutional free exercise claims potentially blur the distinction 
drawn by the Supreme Court between protections for religious belief 
and opinion and protections for practices.280 In Employment Division 
v. Smith the Court declared that the government may not regulate 
“religious beliefs as such”281 but may interfere with overt religious 
acts.282 However, if the central or defining religious exercise of a 
religious community or institution is, in the words of Justice 
Brennan, the perpetuation of an “ongoing tradition of shared 
beliefs,”283 then interference with certain communal acts that 
instantiate and sustain those shared beliefs may be understood to 
impinge upon those beliefs in a way that is not true for individuals. 
For while an individual’s beliefs may take form in his or her 
conscience or mind, a community or institution’s beliefs and identity 
take form and existence in the physical world. Institutions are formed 
to promote and perpetuate these beliefs, which they do in part 
278. See id. at 190, 194.
279. Id. at 188.
280. The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Infranca, supra note 23,
at 1727; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79 (declaring that “while [government 
regulations] cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with 
practices”).
281. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
282. Id. at 878-80.
283. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
540 Michigan State Law Review 2017
through their use of and actions in physical spaces.284 Restrictions 
upon a religious community or institution’s ability to engage in the 
outward acts through which beliefs are developed, witnessed, and 
transferred over time—particularly those that occur within the 
institution’s private property—may, therefore, constitute a regulation 
of the beliefs themselves and substantially burden the community’s 
process of identity formation and transmission.285 In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder the Court hinted at this point when it declared that, although 
the Amish parents were convicted for the “action” of refusing to send 
their children to school, “in this context belief and action cannot be 
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.”286 Government 
intrusion on the provision of sanctuary directly impinges upon the 
religious community’s ability to express, in word and deed, its belief 
and mission. 
The three examples in this Section suggest a few mechanisms 
by which religious communities, through the exercise of both 
property rights and religious liberty, can serve to limit the power of 
the state and provide a foundation for individual rights. Such 
communities carve out a literal space within which individual rights 
are exercised and individual and communal identities are developed 
and expressed. They contribute to a more pluralistic society. And 
they provide the means for collective action challenging the state and 
protecting vulnerable individuals.
B. The Right to Property and Religious Freedom at the Individual 
Level
This Article has argued that religious freedom and the right to 
property play distinct roles in the formation and perpetuation of 
normative communities. These communities, in turn, provide a more 
plausible foundation and source of protection for individual rights 
more generally than does the individual exercise of either right. At 
the same time, the distinct importance of religious freedom and the 
284. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an “institution” as “[a]n 
establishment, organization, or association, instituted for the promotion of some 
object.” 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1046-47 (2d ed. 1989).
285. In Hosanna-Tabor the Court distinguished Smith, which “involved 
government regulation of only outward physical acts,” from the case before it, which 
involved “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 190 (2012). 
286. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
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right to property for such communities depends in part upon a 
broader recognition of the role these rights play in the formation of 
individual identity. In this Section I suggest a few implications of the 
foregoing discussion for thinking about the interaction of property
rights and religious freedom at the individual level.
The roles that property and religious exercise play in relation to 
identity formation and individual autonomy are particularly relevant 
to disputes between religious freedom and property rights, on the one 
hand, and equality norms on the other hand. The most high-profile of 
such conflicts include those involving the claims of religious 
business owners who seek accommodations in the context of laws 
that bar discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Despite the 
significant attention such cases receive, Christopher Lund, in an 
article analyzing claims under the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and similar state laws, found that cases with 
claims akin to the highest-profile cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc.287 and Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,288 are 
statistical outliers and generally unsuccessful.289
These cases typically focus on free exercise claims and related 
First Amendment rights. The property angle and synergies between 
property rights and free exercise are often underappreciated. Deeper 
consideration of the relationship between property and personhood 
suggests new ways to balance the competing rights claims that arise 
in these cases. Rather than focusing narrowly on the conflict between 
First Amendment rights and non-discrimination laws, such an 
analysis would expand the inquiry to consider the broader context in 
287. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
288. 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (rejecting free exercise and other claims of 
wedding photographer who refused to photograph same-sex wedding, in violation of 
state Human Rights Law). The court also rejected a claim pursuant to the New 
Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act on the grounds that the statute did not 
apply to suits between private parties. Id.
289. Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164 (2016). According to Lund, while “[t]here have 
probably been around a few hundred state RFRA cases,” only two (“Elane 
Photography itself, and a recent addition, Arlene’s Flowers”) raise issues involving 
“discrimination or sexual morality or the culture wars.” Id. at 164-65. The 
Washington State Supreme Court rejected Arlene’s Flowers’ challenge—which 
raised free exercise, free speech, and free association claims—to the state’s public 
accommodation law. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548 (Wash. 
2017). The owner of Arlene’s Flowers refused to provide flowers for the wedding of 
a gay couple who had been long-standing customers, in violation of the state’s 
public accommodation law, which bars discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Id. at 549.
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which a given dispute arises. Along these lines, Robert Vischer has 
argued that more attention should be paid to how the actions of 
individuals seeking an exemption from a non-discrimination law 
would affect the marketplace for the good or service in question.290
Vischer proposes that while individuals who seek to act on the basis 
of conscience “should have the freedom to create an economically 
viable agency with a distinct moral identity; they should not have the 
authority to hinder the cultivation of another agency’s conflicting, 
nondiscriminatory moral identity.”291 This Article’s analysis suggests 
something similar, that claims for an exemption from non-
discrimination laws grounded in both the right to property and 
religious liberty, to the extent they are necessary for the formation 
and expression of a distinct personal identity, should trump 
competing claims, except in situations in which protecting such 
claims significantly curtails the ability of others to form and express 
their own identity.292
Careful consideration of the interaction of property rights and 
religious freedom in such disputes suggests a more nuanced 
analytical framework. Rather than solely focusing on the market 
effects of permitting an exemption from non-discrimination laws, it 
would call for an initial determination of where a given service or 
good falls along a continuum akin to that proposed by Margaret 
Radin between personal and fungible property.293 The Fair Housing 
Act’s so-called “Mrs. Murphy exception” might provide a helpful 
touchstone for such an inquiry. This provision exempts certain small-
290. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 4 (2010).
291. Id. at 5.
292. Such an approach bears resemblance to the treatment of property in 
German constitutional law. “In German constitutional law, property is a fundamental 
right that is accorded the highest degree of protection only in cases in which the 
affected interest immediately at stake implicates the owner’s ability to act as an 
autonomous moral and political agent.” Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a 
Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 
739 (2003); c.f. Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious 
Institutions, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201, 210 (2013) (“From a constitutional 
or legal perspective, not all personal decisions and relationships are intrinsic to the 
dignity of the individual. Some choices are peripheral and minor aspects of our 
identity. Other actions are problematic because of their impact on others. There are 
limits to the extent that a person can claim a dignitary interest in causing harm to 
others or subordinating the autonomy of third parties to his control. We do not 
recognize a dignitary interest in acquiring or owning slaves, to cite an obvious 
example.”).
293. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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scale property owners from elements of the Fair Housing Act’s anti-
discrimination provisions for rationales that include protecting the 
privacy of the home (in what can be interpreted as an implicit 
recognition of strong personhood interests in the home).294 Similarly, 
the bundle-of-rights concept of property provides another useful 
framework for evaluating these claims. As Jane Baron has suggested, 
the bundle-of-rights metaphor can help to frame questions and to 
elicit information useful for resolving conflicts.295 For example, in 
determining whether a property owner can exercise a right to 
exclude, the bundle-of-rights metaphor calls for determining “the 
quality of the interaction among the parties, the property institution 
in which the interaction was situated, and its capacity to promote 
reciprocity or domination.”296 An analysis might then proceed to 
evaluate the effects of the owner’s assertion of a right to exclude on 
the non-owner, “whether the parties are symmetrically or 
asymmetrically vulnerable to one another or whether they stand in 
positions of equal (or unequal) respect and dignity.”297 Such a 
context-specific analysis of the exercise of a property right (or a 
claim of religious liberty) enables a clearer determination of the 
consequences of that exercise.298
The application of a similar analytical framework to questions 
of group exclusion would suggest stronger protections for minority 
groups, whose exclusionary acts, on balance, will likely have less of 
an effect on those excluded than the acts of a large group. Moreover, 
to the extent that such groups are likely, by virtue of their minority 
status, to find their own normative commitments and identity less 
reflected in the society at large, they arguably have more to lose—in 
relation to those commitments and that identity—when societal 
norms of any kind are allowed to trump the exercise of their 
communal rights.
Finally, it bears noting that by foregrounding the importance of 
property rights in disputes where they are often ignored, this 
approach reveals a paradox of sorts. To the extent that protections for 
294. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Civil Rights: Lessons from 
Mrs. Murphy for Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 951, 973-
76 (2015) (discussing history and reasoning of the “Mrs. Murphy” exception to the 
Fair Housing Act).
295. See Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in 
Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 89 (2013).
296. Id. at 92.
297. Id. 
298. See id.
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property rights wax and wane depending on the interaction of 
underlying values such as personhood and autonomy, this would 
seem to undermine the contention that property rights are 
foundational.299 This apparent tension might be resolved by 
proposing a more “bottom-up” conception of the foundational nature 
of property rights. On such an account, a given society might have a 
particular vision of freedom and rights generally and might then 
structure particular institutions, such as the right to property, in a 
way that enables those other freedoms to flourish. Although the right 
in question is not prior in time or importance to these other rights or 
values, it would still play a certain role as a foundation.300 This 
reflects the more instrumental understanding of a foundation 
discussed above.301 Reconciling competing claims of free exercise 
rights and other civil rights is a complex issue for which a proper 
treatment would demand significantly more space. My intent here is 
merely to suggest how considering the interaction of property rights 
and religious liberty, along the lines discussed earlier in this Article,
provides new vantages for evaluating such disputes.
CONCLUSION
Both the right to property and religious liberty are, to borrow 
Carol Rose’s colorful description of property specifically, 
particularly “hardy weed[s],” “especially attractive as a vehicle to 
carry other rights.”302 Their tendency to sprout up even in societies 
299. See Alexander, supra note 292, at 739 (“German constitutional law 
treats property as a derivative, or instrumental, value in the general constitutional 
scheme. It strongly protects a particular property interest only to the extent that the 
interest immediately serves other, primary constitutional values—in particular, 
human dignity and self-governance.”). Alexander makes a similar point in 
Commodity and Propriety, where he traces through American history a conception 
of property as “the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper 
social order, the private basis for the public good.” ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 1.
300. Jedediah Purdy suggests what I take to be a similar relationship when he 
writes: “The idea that property and the markets it sets in motion are institutions for 
integrating distinct but complementary dimensions of freedom is still a valuable one 
for defining and allocating claims on resources.” See PURDY, supra note 5, at 116; 
see also Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of Private Law, 66 U. TORONTO L.J.
392, 409 (2016) (contending that “the proper configuration of our private law of 
holdings must rely on its [autonomy-enhancing] telos”).
301. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
302. Rose, supra note 11, at 363 (“Virtually all peoples of whom we have 
any knowledge have invented property regimes for themselves in order to manage 
the resources they find important.”).
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that attempt to forbid them suggests these rights—each in their own 
distinct manner—reveal something important about human nature 
and desire and that, to the extent they survive and thrive, other rights 
are likely to follow.303 Property rights and religious freedom play 
distinct and at times complementary roles in limiting the power of 
the state and protecting individual rights more generally. However, 
this Article has argued they mainly do so indirectly, through their 
role in enabling the formation and continued existence of a range of 
normative communities. The recognition of this important role calls 
for stronger protections for the property rights and religious liberty 
of such communities across a range of contexts.
303. See, e.g., HARVEY COX & DAISAKU IKEDA, THE PERSISTENCE OF 
RELIGION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN SPIRITUALITY (2009); W.S.F.
PICKERING, DURKHEIM’S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION: THEMES AND THEORIES (James 
Clarke & Co 2009). Samuel Moyn, in analyzing the history of human rights, 
remarks that “it is probably the right of possession that has been the most frequently 
asserted and doggedly fortified right in world history.” MOYN, supra note 194, at 17.
